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INTRODUCTION
President Barack H. Obama has repeatedly stated that he
views a capacity for empathy as an essential attribute of a good
judge.1 And conservatives have heaped mountains of scorn upon him for saying so—accusing him of expressing open contempt for the rule of law.2 To date, the debate has been surprisingly one-sided. One federal judge has recently noted that
“President Obama’s statement that judges should have ‘empathy’ was met with strong criticism from his opponents and uncomfortable silence from his supporters.”3 No one has yet offered a sustained scholarly defense of the President’s call for
empathy in judging.4
This Article seeks to fill that void. Part I summarizes and
critiques the agonizingly simplistic and misleading public and
political debate over the proper role empathy (and its popular
adversary—umpiring) in the judicial craft. It laments the success that the President’s critics have had in misleadingly portraying the judicial selection process as a choice between conservative judges who simply call balls and strikes and decide
all cases according to determinative rules set down by the governing sources of law, and liberal judges whose reliance on empathy amounts to ignoring the law and deciding cases in favor
of whichever party seems more sympathetic. Part II then examines the treatment of the President’s call for judicial empathy
at the hands of conservative legal intellectuals, which, disappointingly, tends to be only marginally more nuanced.
In Part III, the Article explains that empathy is properly
defined as the cognitive ability to understand a situation from
the perspective of other people, combined with the emotional
capacity to comprehend and feel those people’s emotions in that
situation. Part III then contrasts empathy with the entirely
distinct concept of sympathy. Empathy involves feeling and
understanding the emotions that other people feel; sympathy
involves feeling sorry for other people.

1. See infra Part IV.A.
2. See infra Parts II, III.
3. Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons
from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1647 (2010).
4. See John Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain Future of
President Obama’s “Empathy Standard,” 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 90 (2010),
available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/903.pdf (noting that the Left
has steadfastly avoided a “scholastic debate over the merits of empathy”).
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In Part IV, the Article seeks to explain why empathy is in
fact an essential characteristic of a good judge. The President’s
critics might be surprised to find that the argument here is neither grounded in extralegal, touchy-feely notions of humanity
and compassion nor based on some sort of radical vision of
wealth redistribution through activist courts. Nor, for that matter, does it spring from a post-Realist rejection of “law” as a legitimate constraining force on judges. Quite to the contrary, the
argument is grounded in a firm commitment to the rule of law
and a deep-seated appreciation of—rather than rejection of—
legal doctrine. In brief, legal doctrine, at both the constitutional
and subconstitutional level, is permeated with reasonableness
and balancing tests and other doctrinal mechanisms that cannot possibly be employed effectively unless judges are able to
gain an empathic appreciation of the case from the perspective
of all of the litigants. A judge can neither craft nor employ legal
doctrine competently if she is not willing and able to understand
the perspectives of, and the burdens upon, all of the parties.
Part V then endeavors to illustrate the shortcomings of the
model of non-empathic, umpire judging. It argues that a judge
who believes in the popular portrait of judges as umpires, and
who rejects as illegitimate calls for judicial empathy, will fail to
realize that, while he thinks that he is simply calling objective
balls and strikes, he is in fact unwittingly giving disproportionate weight in his doctrinal calculus to the interests of those
whose perspectives come most naturally to him. Finally, Part
VI paints a portrait of the ideal empathic judge—a judge who
has a talent for empathy and makes a conscious effort to empathize with all parties, thus ensuring that she is not subconsciously undervaluing the interests of those whose perspectives
she does not instinctively appreciate. Part VI explains that, far
from being the enemy of judicial neutrality, empathy is in fact
necessary to impartial judging.
I. THE “UMPATHY” DIVIDE AND THE POVERTY OF
POPULAR DISCOURSE ON JUDGING
Over the five-year period from 2005 to 2010, the Senate
Judiciary Committee held confirmation hearings for four Supreme Court nominees—a sudden flood of activity that followed
more than a decade without a single high court vacancy. Some
observers celebrated those events as a rare opportunity for the
American public to give serious consideration to matters of ju-
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dicial philosophy.5 Alas, the opportunity, if there ever truly was
one, was squandered. In the place of thoughtful dialogue and
public education, the hearings presented the American people
with maddeningly simplistic and vapid accounts of judicial decision making. They pitted against each other two starkly contrasting visions of the role of the judge.6 On the right, we had
the portrait, popularized by Chief Justice Roberts in his confirmation hearings, of the judge as detached umpire—simply
calling balls and strikes, applying the law, rather than making
it.7 On the left, we had the portrait, popularized by President
Obama, of the engaged, empathic judge—whose decisions are
influenced by a “quality of empathy, of understanding and
identifying with people’s hopes and struggles.”8
In the form in which they were received by the public, both
portraits are clumsy and vacuous caricatures.9 And it is the
conservatives who, it seems, have been most successful in shaping the public’s understanding of both models. That is to say,
conservatives have had considerable success in portraying the
5. See generally Dahlia Lithwick, Teach to America, SLATE (June 4, 2009,
5:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/
06/teach_to_america.html.
6. As Matthew Frank put it, the “line between the Democrats and the
Republicans” at these hearings “might be called the ‘umpathy’ line.” See The
Federalist Society Online Debate Series: The Sotomayor Nomination, Part II,
FEDERALIST SOC’Y (July 13, 2009), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.30/
default.asp.
7. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.
to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of
John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules;
they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a
ball game to see the umpire.”).
8. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (May 1, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert
-gibbs-5-1-09 (statement of President Obama).
9. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 5–8 (2007) (criticizing a popular
discourse that presents judges as either nonpolitical umpires or purely ideological politicians); Francis J. Mootz III, Ugly American Hermeneutics, 10 NEV.
L.J. 587, 588 (2010) (referring to this rhetoric as “ugly American hermeneutics”); Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. &
POL. 123, 125 (2011) ( lamenting the “legitimacy dichotomy”: “the notion that
judges faced with constitutional disputes either behave in a democratically legitimate manner by dutifully obeying the sovereign people’s constitutional instructions or behave in a democratically illegitimate manner by usurping the
role of the sovereign people and imposing their own personal preferences on
the rest of the nation”).
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judicial selection process as a choice between conservative
judges who dutifully and humbly follow the law without regard
to their own personal preferences and liberal judges who brazenly ignore or defy the law so as to rule out of personal sympathy for their preferred groups.10
Painting judging in this light obviously serves political
goals, and perhaps does so quite effectively. But it undermines
any serious attempt to educate the public about judicial decision making.11 On that score, neither of these portraits is in the
least bit enlightening.
10. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 98 (noting that conservatives have succeeded in turning into “conventional wisdom” the “picture of liberal judges as
rogue jurists who make up the law as they go along and conservative judges
who act as humble clerks to the Founders and the legislative wisdom of the
day”). Senator Jeff Sessions was a typical source of this rhetoric. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Hearings] (Statement of Sen. Sessions) ( portraying the Supreme Court selection
process as a choice between “impartial and wise judges” who guide us to “objective truth” and a “Brave New World” in which “a judge is free to push his or
her own political or social agenda”); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Kagan Hearings]
(remarks of Sen. Sessions) (“There are two views of the courts. One is the
judge as a neutral umpire. The other view is that a judge should be activist . . . [and believe] that they have a right to advance a political agenda.”).
Of course, when the choice is portrayed in these terms, the “correct” answer is obvious. See THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 2008 POST-ELECTION SURVEY
OF 800 ACTUAL VOTERS, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/
20081105_PostElectionSurvey11408.pdf ( presenting results of a 2008 survey
that found that the public overwhelmingly prefers judges who “will interpret
and apply the law as it is written and not take into account their own viewpoints and experiences” over judges who “will go beyond interpreting and applying the law and take into account their own viewpoints and experiences”).
If, however, a more charitable picture of the empathic judge is presented, the
public is much more receptive. See Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 366 (2011) ( presenting results of a 2009 survey that
found that fifty-nine percent of the public believes it to be either somewhat or
very important for Supreme Court justices to “feel empathy for the people involved in a case”); James L. Gibson, Expecting Justice and Hoping for Empathy, PAC. STANDARD (June 20, 2010), http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal
-affairs/expecting-justice-and-hoping-for-empathy-17677/ ( presenting results of
a 2009 survey that found that two-thirds of the public assigns the highest degree of importance to a judge being “able to empathize with ordinary people—
that is, to be able to understand how the law hurts or helps the people,” and
only eight percent rates this characteristic as entirely unimportant).
11. See Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1630 (“Though much of the rhetoric
about judges and judging has proven politically expedient for politicians and
interest groups engaged in judicial confirmation fights, it has been a disservice
to the American public and the federal judiciary.”).
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The judge-as-umpire analogy has the potential to be nuanced and perhaps even edifying,12 and maybe Chief Justice
Roberts meant to invoke a complicated concept.13 But the message received by the public—and the Senate—lacked any such
subtlety.14 Rather, the message came across that good judges
(which is to say, conservative judges) decide all cases by simply
following the law, mechanically calling balls and strikes according to clear and determinative rules set down by the Framers
and legislatures.15
This bears virtually no resemblance to the actual process of
judging. It should be difficult for any knowledgeable person to
take seriously the claim that good, principled, “non-activist”
judges never make law—that they, instead, simply act as umpires, discerning in every case the single, correct answer that is
inexorably dictated by the governing legal authorities.16 As Er12. See generally Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of )
the Umpire Analogy, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525 (2009); Theodore A. McKee,
Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709 (2007).
13. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 7, at 205–06 (noting that judges bring
their life experiences to the bench and that reasonable people can sometimes
disagree about the proper answer to constitutional questions).
14. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 95 (“Listening to John Roberts, one might
have wondered how the Supreme Court ever came to be so highly regarded. He
made it sound as if the work of a Justice were no more complicated than assembling a futon from Ikea, a task that most any person could do who had an
aptitude for following directions and the patience of Job.”); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 702–
11 (2007); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1636 (“The judge-as-umpire construct establishes a false choice between the judge who calls balls and strikes, and
nothing more, and the activist judge who behaves extrajudiciously.”).
15. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8
(2009) ( lamenting that “Senate confirmation hearings . . . bolster the popular
fable that constitutional adjudication can be practiced in something close to an
objective and mechanical fashion”). Louis Michael Seidman had little patience
for Justice Sotomayor’s testimony to this effect at her confirmation hearings:
How could someone who has been on the bench for seventeen years
possibly believe that judging in hard cases involves no more than applying the law to the facts? First year law students understand within
a month that many areas of the law are open textured and indeterminate—that the legal material frequently . . . must be supplemented by
contestable presuppositions, empirical assumptions, and moral judgments. To claim otherwise—to claim that fidelity to uncontested legal
principles dictates results—is to claim that whenever Justices disagree among themselves, someone is either a fool or acting in bad faith.
What does it say about our legal system that in order to get confirmed
Judge Sotomayor must tell the lies that she told today? That judges and
justices must live these lies throughout their professional carers [sic]?
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, supra note 6.
16. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears
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win Chemerinsky has explained, “any first year law student
knows that judges make law constantly. The first year student’s common law subjects are almost entirely judge-made
law. Interpretation of an ambiguous statute or a constitutional
provision’s broad, open-textured language is also a judge’s legal
product.”17 Surely “we are all realists now” in the simple sense
were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”); RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78 (2008) (arguing that neither Chief Justice
Roberts “nor any other knowledgeable person actually believed or believes that
the rules that judges in our system apply, particularly appellate judges and
most particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them
the way the rules of baseball are given to umpires”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) (discussing and
accepting the lawmaking role of judges); id. at 1181, 1186 (noting that when
judges apply standards, rather than bright-line rules, “there is no single ‘right’
answer”).
If I were a judicial nominee testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and a Senator asked me a question suggesting that principled judges
always reach clear answers dictated by the law, I would be tempted to answer
by pointing out that Justices Scalia and Thomas—the most favored Justices of
the political right—disagreed in twenty cases in the last Term alone. See The
Supreme Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 414 tbl.I
(2010). “Senator,” I would ask, “which one of them is the principled judicial
umpire, and which one is the hopeless judicial activist?” Justice Kagan came
about as close as a nominee can realistically be expected to get to giving an
answer along these lines when she testified as to the limits of the umpire
analogy:
I suppose the way in which I think that the metaphor does have its
limits . . . [is] that the metaphor might suggest to some people that
law is a kind of robotic enterprise, that there is a kind of automatic
quality to it, that it is easy, that we just sort of stand there and, you
know, we go ball and strike, and everything is clear-cut and that
there is no judgment in the process. And I do think that that is not
right, and it is especially not right at the Supreme Court level, where
the hardest cases go and the cases that have been the subject of most
dispute go. . . . [ W ]e do know that not every case is decided 9-0, and
that is not because anybody is acting in bad faith. It is because those
legal judgments are ones in which reasonable people can reasonably
disagree sometimes.
Kagan Hearings, supra note 10, at 203 (2010).
17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the
Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006);
see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 91 (2010) (observing that “it was apparent to
many that the law has inconsistencies, runs out, and routinely comes up
against unanticipated situations and that judges possess a substantial degree
of flexibility when working with legal materials”); Michael Abramowicz &
Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 965, 1036 (2009) (“[E]ven those who rail against so-called ‘judicial activism’ now generally accept that judges sometimes make law. That reality . . . cannot be denied.”) (footnote omitted); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases
Make Bad Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 888 (2006) (“[ W ]hether in the context
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that any even remotely sophisticated student of law recognizes
that the formal sources of law often do not dictate clear and unequivocal answers to the questions posed to judges.18 The popular judge-as-umpire portrait utterly fails to acknowledge the
basic reality of judging.
As for the other portrait—the empathic judge—
conservatives have largely succeeded in painting it in such
spectacularly unflattering terms19 that the Democratic members of the Judiciary Committee shied away from defending
it,20 President Obama’s own Supreme Court nominees appeared
to reject it,21 and even the President himself eventually backed
off of it.22 “Empathy,” as observers of political discourse have
noted, has “become code now for activist judge.”23
of pure common law decisionmaking or instead in the context of the supposed
‘interpretation’ of capacious language in statutes or the Constitution, it is far
too late in the day to deny that judges are often . . . engaged in the process of
making law.”).
18. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
165 (1921) (noting that there are cases in which the law does not dictate a
clear answer); Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 50–51
(2010); Pettys, supra note 9, at 124 (noting that “judges faced with constitutional controversies often must choose from an array of conflicting—yet conventionally permissible—interpretive options”). See generally Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV.
267 (1997).
19. “By the time the Sotomayor hearings began, Republicans were united
in their aim to put empathy on trial. In their opening statements, every Republican member of the Senate Judiciary Committee singled out the term for
abuse.” Rollert, supra note 4, at 92.
20. See id. at 90.
21. See Sotomayor Hearings, supra note 10, at 120 (“I don’t—wouldn’t approach the issue of judging in the way the President does.”); Wardlaw, supra
note 3, at 1631 (“That one word became so politically charged that Supreme
Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor went on record as distancing herself from the
approach to judging espoused by the President.”); Kagan Disregards Obama
View on Empathy, BLOG LEGALTIMES (June 29, 2010, 12:51 PM), http://
legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/kagan-disregards-obama-view-on-empathy
.html (“As Justice Sonia Sotomayor did a year ago, Supreme Court nominee
Elena Kagan backed away today from President Barack Obama’s statements
about the role of empathy in judging.”).
22. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 90, 105 (noting that President Obama
made no mention of empathy when Justice Stevens retired or when Justice
Kagan was nominated); Wardlaw, supra note 3 (noting that “Sotomayor distanced herself from it; and the President, perhaps believing that discretion is
the better part of valor, never repeated it”).
23. Transcript of American Morning, CNN.COM (July 14, 2009), http://
archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0907/14/ltm.03.html (remarks of CNN correspondent Carol Costello); see also Rollert, supra note 4, at 92 (referring to
empathy as “the Scarlet E”); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1631 (explaining that
empathy “became a code word for judicial overreaching, and it served as the
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According to many conservatives, liberals openly and unabashedly view judging as a purely political act. Accordingly, the
only thing that liberals look for in a judge is an assurance that
he or she will reach politically liberal results.24 As one commentator sees it:
For most liberal judges, the primary purpose of being a judge is to
promote social justice and transform society. That is why liberal judges are so much more likely to be judicial activists than conservative
judges. Most liberal judges do not see their roles as merely adjudicating
a dispute according to the law. They see their role primarily as using
the law and their power to rule on the law to promote social justice.25

Thus, claim conservatives, “as a general matter . . . political conservatives want non-ideological judges, not
‘conservative’ ones, while political liberals want ideologically
liberal judges.”26
Those who ascribe to this cynical view of liberal judicial
philosophy take President Obama’s call for judicial empathy as
an acknowledgement of his preference for this approach—as a
stunningly honest confession that he wants judges who will ignore the law and instead decide cases in favor of minorities and
the oppressed.27 They insist that, because “judging based on
blank slate onto which politicians painted doomsday scenarios of a judiciary
run amok”).
24. See, e.g., Rush Limbaugh, A Look Inside the Liberal Mind,
RUSHLIMABUGH.COM (June 30, 2009), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/
daily/site_063009/content/01125112.guest.html (“I think it’s time to forget
holding out hope for liberal judges, folks. They are not like us. They don’t look
at the judicial system the way we do. They don’t look at the law the way we
do. . . . They don’t look at the law as a means of finding legal adjudications to
cases [sic]. They look at the law and the court system as a way to level the
playing field according to their view of how it’s unfair.”).
25. Dennis Prager, Why Reporters—and Judges and Professors—Are Biased, TOWNHALL (Nov. 25, 2008), http://townhall.com/columnists/DennisPrager/
2008/11/25/why_reporters_--_and_judges_and_professors_--_are_biased/page/full/.
26. Matthew J. Franck, Souter Vacancy I: Toward Armistice in the Judicial Wars?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 3, 2009, 4:29 PM), http://www
.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/50214.
27. See, e.g., Rollert, supra note 4 (“To the Right, empathy was nothing
less than a code word for judicial activism, a dog whistle to the Democratic
base that the President would choose judges who would put the counsel of a
bleeding heart above the demands of impartial justice.”); Karl Rove, Op-Ed.,
“Empathy” is Code for Judicial Activism, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at A13
(“‘Empathy’ is the latest code word for liberal activism, for treating the Constitution as malleable clay to be kneaded and molded in whatever form justices
want. It represents an expansive view of the judiciary in which courts create
policy that couldn’t pass the legislative branch or, if it did, would generate voter backlash.”); Editorial, After Souter, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 4, 2009, 4:00
AM), http://article.nationalreview.com/393115/after-souter/the-editors (“Empathy is simply a codeword for an inclination toward liberal activ-
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empathy is really just legislating from the bench,”28 President
Obama’s empathy standard is “antithetical to the proper role of
a judge.”29
II. THE VIEW OF EMPATHY AMONG CONSERVATIVE
LEGAL INTELLECTUALS
One might be tempted to speculate that these crude portraits, however much salience they might have with lay commentators, politicians, and the general public,30 hold no sway
over those who should know better.31 Perhaps this is all just
dumbed-down political theater, and is recognized as such by seism. . . . [President Obama] cares about getting another vote for liberal results.”); Gary Bauer, Commentary, An Ideological Choice, WASH. TIMES (May
27, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/an-ideological
-choice/ (“Mr. Obama has told us what kind of judges he is seeking: judges who
feel unconstrained by the plain language of the law or the text of the Constitution, judges who instead will act on their ‘empathy,’ on their own sense of right
and wrong. He wants judges who will legislate from the bench. That is the
very definition of judicial activism.”); Transcript of Special Report With Bret
Baier Panel on President Obama Replacing Justice Souter, FOXNEWS.COM
(May 4, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,518880,00
.html (remarks of Fred Barnes) (arguing that President Obama’s claim to be
searching for a Justice who understands how law affects people’s lives is “what
liberal judicial activism . . . is all about. It’s entirely results oriented”).
28. Sotomayor Hearings, supra note 10, at 17 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
29. Id. at 40 (statement of Sen. Coburn); see also id. at 6 (statement of
Sen. Sessions) (“[O]ur system will only be further corrupted . . . as a result of
President Obama’s views that, in tough cases, the critical ingredient for a
judge is the ‘depth and breadth of one’s empathy.’”); Charles Krauthammer,
Op-Ed., Sotomayor: Rebut, Then Confirm, WASH. POST, May 29, 2009, at A17
(insisting that “conservatism . . . stands unequivocally against justice as empathy”); Rich Lowry, A Bad Day for Impartiality, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 26,
2009,
6:15
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/227584/bad-day
-impartiality/rich-lowry (“Impartiality has been supplanted by empathy. The
old-fashioned virtue of objectivity—redolent of dusty law books and the unromantic task of parsing the law and facts—is giving way to an inherently politicized notion of judging based on feelings. Lady Justice is to slip her blindfold
and let her decisions be influenced by her life experiences and personal predilections.”); Transcript of “This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” ABC (May
3, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=7491153&page=1#.T1FQ0_
EgcUJ (remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (dubbing empathy “a code word for an
activist judge” and suggesting that empathic judges rule “on the basis of their
personal politics, their personal feelings, their personal preferences”).
30. See Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 112 (2010) (observing that “one might think the
popular culture is the last preserve of vulgar formalism”).
31. Cf. TAMANAHA, supra note 17, at 197 (“No one thinks that law is autonomous and judging is mechanical deduction, and rare is the informed jurist
who thinks that judges are engaged in the single-minded pursuit of their personal preferences.”).
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rious intellectuals of all stripes. But my impression is that
many—though of course not all—conservative legal intellectuals do indeed believe a somewhat softened version of these
claims. They do think that there are “correct” doctrinal answers
to most of even the thorniest legal questions,32 and they doubt
very much that liberals have any genuine interest in ascertaining them.33 Viewed charitably, their line of reasoning would
appear to be that liberals have been seduced by what might be
called “vulgar realism”34 to believe that law is radically indeterminate, and thus that it must really be the judges’ political
beliefs that decide cases.35 As such, liberals have given up on
law, and they simply ask judges to be reliable liberal politicians.36 When President Obama calls for empathy in judging,
32. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 863 (1989) (arguing that, for “the vast majority of questions the answer is
clear”); Frederick Liu, Comment, The Supreme Court Appointments Process
and the Real Divide Between Liberals and Conservatives, 117 YALE L.J. 1947,
1951 (2008) (“Judicial conservatives believe that traditional legal authorities—
text, history, and structure—rarely run out; the law almost always yields a
single right answer.”).
33. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of
Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 283 (1995) (arguing that liberals
believe that fundamental questions of public policy should be decided by “the
Justices of the Supreme Court, guided only by their own notions (or those of
some professor or clerk) of what is good for the country”); cf. Lee Renzin, Note,
Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction—Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1998) (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“‘We have liberal
activists who ignore what the law is, don’t care what the law is.’”).
34. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 728 (1997).
35. See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1998) (“We live in a post-Legal Realist Age, when
most legal commentators take it for granted that law cannot be disentangled
from politics and that legal judgment is driven by the political beliefs of the
decisionmaker.”); Pettys, supra note 9, at 130 (noting that many second- and
third-year law students “believe that litigators often cite what they describe as
‘authorities’ in order to try to shape the judge’s preferences—but at the end of
the day, the judge’s preferences are what centrally matter”); Suzanna Sherry,
Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 461, 461–
65 (2009) ( lamenting the extent to which this belief has pervaded the legal
academy). Likewise, the attitudinalist political science literature has been
characterized by a tendency to view judicial opinions as merely the product of
the judge’s politics, see Sherry, supra, at 461–62, and to view law professors as
hopelessly naive for continuing to pay attention to legal doctrine, see H. Jefferson Powell, A Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right
Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1725 (2009).
36. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S6603 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2010) (remarks of
Sen. Sessions) (attributing future Justice Kagan’s judicial views to the fact
that “many liberal activists in America have lost faith in the idea of objectivity, which means they have lost faith in the reality of objective truth, the find-
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he simply means that politician-judges should be good liberals
and favor the sympathetic little guy.
Sentiments along these lines have been expressed by conservative commentators with serious legal credentials37 and by
conservative judges and law professors.38 Steven Calabresi, for
instance, summarizes President Obama’s “extreme left-wing
views about the role of judges. He believes—and he is quite
open about this—that judges ought to decide cases in light of
the empathy they ought to feel for the little guy in any lawsuit.”39 Obama’s view is that “[e]mpathy, not justice, ought to
be the mission of the federal courts, and the redistribution of
wealth should be their mantra.”40 Which means, in turn, that
Obama’s emphasis on empathy in essence requires the appointment
of judges committed in advance to violating [their] oath. To the traditional view of justice as a blindfolded person weighing legal claims

ing of which—the finding of truth—has been the goal, the central focus of the
American legal system since its creation”); EISGRUBER, supra note 9, at 7–8
(attributing an approach much like this one to Sen. Charles Schumer).
37. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Barack Obama: The Present is Prologue, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 7, 2008, at A22 (quoting Theodore Olson, former Solicitor General
of the United States) (claiming that President Obama “is looking for someone
who would make judicial decisions based upon emotions and sympathy and
picking the underdog, rather than applying the law”); Wendy E. Long, Op-Ed.,
Opening of a Sorry Chapter, WASH. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at A21 (deriding “empathy” as a “lawless standard of partiality”); Lithwick, supra note 5 (noting
remarks of Ed Whelan, former law clerk to Justice Scalia, former principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department, and former General Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee) (claiming that liberals “see[ ] no meaningful constraints on interpretive
methodologies and look[ ] to the Supreme Court to pave the way to a progressive future by inventing a continuing series of new rights”); Jessie Weiser, Define Empathy, RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER BLOG (May 21, 2009), http://blogs
.rj.org/rac/2009/05/21/define_empathy (quoting Wendy Long, former law clerk
to Justice Thomas) (“Lady Justice doesn’t have empathy for anyone. She rules
strictly based upon the law and that’s really the only way that our system can
function properly under the Constitution.”); Edward Whelan, Obama’s Constitution, WEEKLY STANDARD (March 17, 2008), http://www.weeklystandard.com/
print/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/849oyckg.asp (“No clearer prescription for lawless judicial activism [than President Obama’s call for empathy] is
possible”); id. (“So much for the judicial virtue of dispassion. So much for the
craft of judging that is distinct from politics.”).
38. For a good place to start for the view among some conservative law
professors that liberals want judges to ignore the law, see generally Lino A.
Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631 (1993).
39. Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., Obama’s “Redistribution” Constitution,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2008, at A17.
40. Id.
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fairly on a scale, he wants to tear the blindfold off, so the judge can
rule for the party he empathizes with most.41

In welcome contrast to these overblown fusillades, my colleague, Orin Kerr, has offered a significantly more sophisticated take on President Obama’s call for empathic judges. In an
extended blog post, Kerr suggests that, to understand what
President Obama means by empathy, “we need to recognize the
important but usually overlooked differences in how different
people understand the role of ambiguity in judicial
decisionmaking.”42 Kerr notes “that there is a sliding scale between cases where the relevant legal materials point to an absolute answer and cases where there is a tougher call to make,”
and he opines that, when it comes to cases at the latter end of
the scale, “there are two different ways to deal with this kind of
legal ambiguity.”43 The first “approach is to see legal ambiguity
as cause for judicial weighing. This view sees the role of the
judge as narrow.”44 On this view, the
judge must weigh the best legal arguments on one side and the best
legal arguments for the other, and must pick the side that has the
better of it, no matter how slight the advantage. If a case is 55/45,
[then] there is a correct answer, because 55 is greater than 45. 45
41. Id.; see also Lino A. Graglia, Birthright Citizenship for Children of Illegal Aliens: An Irrational Public Policy, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 11 (2009)
(“Justice Brennan never let law, fact, or logic stand in the way of a decision he
wanted to reach. He agreed with President Barack Obama that the function of
the court was to decide challenging cases on the basis of ‘empathy.’” (footnote
omitted)); Thomas B. Griffith, Was Bork Right About Judges?, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 157, 159–62 (2011) (arguing that many liberal intellectuals believe
that judges should be results oriented rather than neutral); id. at 162–63
(suggesting that President Obama’s call for empathy in judging “will lead a
judge to side with the disadvantaged . . . in the face of law that requires a different outcome”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Subjective Art; Objective Law, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2010) (arguing that “evocations of judicial
empathy” are indicative of judges who engage in “freewheeling adjudication”
and give into temptation “to do justice as they feel it should be done rather
than adhering to the strictures of text and structure”); id. at 1676 (arguing
that empathy “has no place in judging”); id. at 1678 (arguing that “it requires
a certain chutzpah . . . to assert that empathy . . . should be used by judges in
reaching legal determinations”); John Yoo, Empathy Triumphs Over Excellence, ENTERPRISE BLOG (May 26, 2009, 1:03 PM), http://blog.american
.com/2009/05/empathy-triumphs-over-excellence/ (suggesting that then-Judge
Sotomayor decided cases on the basis of her “‘empathy’ rather than a correct
reading of the Constitution”).
42. Orin Kerr, Legal Ambiguity, Empathy, and the Role of Judicial Power,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2009, 5:51 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/05/13/
legal-ambiguity-empathy-and-the-role-of-judicial-power/.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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The other approach, by contrast, “is to see legal ambiguity as
cause for judicial empowerment.”46 On this alternative view,
the judge must “dutifully follow[] the law when the law is clear.
But as soon as there is some ambiguity, and the law is unclear,
then the judge is free to decide the case however he wants.”47
There is no need “for a case to be truly 50/50” for the judge to
follow her own preferences.48
So long as there is some appreciable legal ambiguity, there is no clear
“correct” answer. Maybe 70/30 is enough, or maybe even 75/25 will do.
Either way, the lack of a “correct” answer means that the judge can
rule in a way that furthers whatever normative vision of the law that
the judge happens to like.49

Kerr opines that President Obama’s statements about empathy indicate that he “is in the latter camp: He sees legal ambiguity as a cause for judicial empowerment. He believes that
when there is legal ambiguity, a judge is then free to make the
decision he wants.”50 Thus,
Obama sees empathy as critical because he thinks that judges in close
cases have a free choice as to which side should win. A substantial
number of the close cases that reach the Supreme Court involve some
sort of power dynamic—employer versus employee, plaintiff versus
big company—and Obama wants the judge who will pick the side of
the powerless.51

In its nuance, this interpretation is certainly more charitable to the President than other recent critiques of empathy in
judging have typically been. Yet it still boils down to an assertion that, in some meaningful category of important cases (indeed, the most important and most difficult cases), judges of
the sort favored by the President self-consciously choose politically desirable results over legally stronger arguments. In the
hardest of cases, conservative judges do their best to follow the
law regardless of their policy preferences, whereas empathic
judges consciously ignore or override their own sense of the
stronger legal argument in favor of their policy preferences.52

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. In fairness to Kerr, he goes out of his way to point out that this “view
of the judicial power isn’t necessarily conservative or liberal; it is very much
the view of Richard Posner, who envisions that position as a ‘realist’ and
‘pragmatist’ view.” Id.
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If even Orin Kerr—as thoughtful and fair-minded a conservative public intellectual as they come—thinks that this is
what liberals are looking for in an empathic judge, then liberals
need to do a much better job of explaining themselves.
III. THE NATURE OF EMPATHY
In order to defend empathy, we must first define it. We
could easily get bogged down at this first step, for the meaning
of “empathy” is surprisingly elusive. The word is relatively new
to the English language, and for many years the science and
social science literature has struggled to agree upon a definition.53 But for our purposes, the dictionary definition should do
fine.54 Empathy is “the action of understanding, being aware of,
being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings,
thoughts, and experience of another of either the past or present without having the feelings, thoughts, and experience fully
communicated in an objectively explicit manner; also: the capacity for this.”55
That is to say, empathy involves the cognitive skill of perspective taking—the ability to see a situation from someone
else’s perspective—combined with the emotional capacity to
understand and feel that person’s emotions in that situation.56
53. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. MORRELL, EMPATHY AND DEMOCRACY: FEELING,
THINKING, AND DELIBERATION 39–66 (2010); Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic
Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 133, 134 (noting
that “empathy is a term with no fixed meaning”); Justin D’Arms, Empathy
and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1467, 1477 (2000) (“Though
‘empathy’ is a relatively recent term in English, it has already become ambiguous.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1009
(2010) (noting that scholars have used the term “empathy” to denote a number
of different concepts); Bert S. Moore, The Origins and Development of Empathy, 14 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 75, 76 (1990); Frederique de Vignemont &
Tania Singer, The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why?, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 435, 435 (2006) (“There are probably nearly as many definitions of
empathy as people working on the topic.”); Lauren Wispé, History of the Concept of Empathy, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 17, 17–37 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer eds., 1987).
54. Then-Senator (and presidential candidate) Obama once wrote in a letter to a child, “If you don’t already know what it means, I want you to look up
the word ‘empathy’ in the dictionary. I believe we don’t have enough empathy
in our world today, and it is up to your generation to change that.” Doreen Yu,
Pinay Girl Writes to Obama, Gets Response, PHILIPPINE STAR (Nov. 7, 2008,
12:00 AM), http://www.philstar.com/article.aspx?articleid=413244.
55. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed. 2003).
56. The psychology literature emphasizes that true empathy goes beyond
perspective taking; there is a necessary component of emotional engagement.
See, e.g., Frans B.M. de Waal, Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The
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Empathy does not, then, dictate or even imply a propensity
to act in any particular way, or to favor any particular group.
“Empathy is first and foremost a capacity. Strictly speaking, it
is value-free. . . . What one does with the insight provided by
empathic understanding” is a separate inquiry from whether or
not one is capable of empathizing.57 By the same token, empathy is manifestly not the same thing as sympathy. To sympathize is to feel for someone; to empathize is to feel with them.58
“[W]hen you feel sympathy for another with a problem, you do
not actually experience emotions parallel to their’s [sic]; instead, you experience different emotions that are associated
with concern or sorrow for another.”59 To empathize with others, by contrast, is not to feel sorry for them or to feel a need to
help them; it is simply to understand things from their perspective and to be able to sense what they are feeling.60 Virtually
everyone experiences empathy; humans are hard-wired to em-

Evolution of Empathy, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 285 (2008) (finding perspective-taking is only empathy in combination with emotional engagement);
Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer, Critical Issues in the Study of Empathy, in
EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 3, 5 (noting empathy requires sharing perceived emotions or “feeling with” another). “Empathy . . . requires not only that you can identify another person’s feelings and
thoughts, but that you respond to these with an appropriate emotion too.”
SIMON BARON-COHEN, ZERO DEGREES OF EMPATHY 11 (2011).
57. Michael Franz Basch, Empathic Understanding: A Review of the Concept and Some Theoretical Considerations, 31 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N
101, 119, 123 (1983).
58. See, e.g., Jean Decety & Kalina J. Michalska, Neurodevelopmental
Changes in the Circuits Underlying Empathy and Sympathy from Childhood
to Adulthood, 13 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 886, 886 (2010) (noting that it is important to “distinguish between empathy (the ability to appreciate the emotions and feelings of others with a minimal distinction between self and other)
and sympathy (feelings of concern about the welfare of others)”); Darrick
Jolliffe & David P. Farrington, Development and Validation of the Basic Empathy Scale, 29 J. ADOLESCENCE 589, 591 (2006) (noting that sympathy and
empathy “are distinct and separate constructs” because empathy involves
“emotion congruence” whereas “sympathy involves the appraisal of how one
feels about the emotions of another”).
59. Nadine R. Richendoller & James B. Weaver III, Exploring the Links
Between Personality and Empathic Response Style, 17 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 303, 304 (1994).
60. See Vignemont & Singer, supra note 53; cf. Bandes, supra note 53, at
136 (“Empathy is a capacity, not an emotion. It differs from sympathy or compassion . . . . Empathy does not require, or necessarily lead to, sympathy.”);
D’Arms, supra note 53, at 1479 (noting that “sympathy is an emotion, empathy is a way of acquiring an emotion”).
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pathize.61 Indeed, the complete inability to do so is the defining
characteristic of a psychopath.62
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPATHY IN JUDGING
Judge Richard Posner has suggested that, when it comes to
judging, “the internal perspective—the putting oneself in the
other person’s shoes—that is achieved by the exercise of empathetic imagination lacks normative significance.”63 It seems
that a great many lawyers, judges, and legal academics would
tend to agree. After all, the “popular image of lawyers is that
we are committed to formal rationality. We are trained to cabin
‘empathic’ responses and remain steadfast in our commitment
to legal principles despite emotional dissonance.”64 The object of
this Article is to establish that, when properly understood, empathy is an essential tool of an effective judge. The argument in
support of that assertion unfolds in four steps that cut progressively deeper into both the nature of judging and the nature of
empathy.

61. See de Waal, supra note 56; Robert Plutchik, Evolutionary Bases of
Empathy, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 38, 38–46
(discussing the use of empathy in the evolution and survival of animals and
humans); Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B.M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate
and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 9–14 (2002).
62. See ROBERT L. KATZ, EMPATHY: ITS NATURE AND USES 58 (1963);
Tania Singer, The Neuronal Basis of Empathy and Fairness, in EMPATHY AND
FAIRNESS 20, 20 (Greg Bock & Jamie Goode eds., 2007) (noting a lack of empathy defines psychopaths who can hurt others guilt-free). Simon Baron-Cohen
explains that persons with zero empathy tend to fall into one of two categories.
The first includes those with autism or Asperger’s syndrome; they have no
empathy, but they tend to follow the law and behave “super-morally” as a
product of their “systemising” nature. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at
65–84. The second includes those with pathological conditions like borderline
personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder; they are likely to harm others and are utterly unmoved by the
pain and misery that they visit upon others. See id. at 29–64.
63. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 381 (1995). But see POSNER,
supra note 16, at 117 ( listing “empathy” as component of judgment, to which
judges must turn when the law is not clear).
64. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law:
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2103 (1989).
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A. THE INITIAL CUT: EMPATHY IN JUDGING MEANS SEEING (AND
UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECT OF ) THE ISSUE FROM ALL SIDES
President Obama has never spelled out in detail the role
that he intends empathy to play in judicial decision making.65
Indeed, some feel that he has sent conflicting signals in this regard.66 But, it is nonetheless possible to distill from his statements a basic vision of judicial empathy.67
In explaining his vote against Chief Justice Roberts, thenSenator Obama declared that “adherence to legal precedent
and rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent of the cases that come before a court, so that
both a Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at the same place most
of the time on those 95 percent of the cases.”68 But in the other
five percent,
adherence to precedent and rules of construction and interpretation
will only get you through the 25th mile of the marathon. That last
mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s
core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how the world works, and
the depth and breadth of one’s empathy. . . .
In those circumstances, your decisions about whether affirmative action is an appropriate response to the history of discrimination in this
country or whether a general right of privacy encompasses a more
specific right of women to control their reproductive decisions or
whether the commerce clause empowers Congress to speak on those
issues of broad national concern that may be only tangentially related
65. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 92–93 (arguing that no one at the
Sotomayor confirmation hearings really knew what President Obama meant
when he said that empathy is an essential ingredient in judicial decision
making).
66. See Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor
Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010) (noting that some of President
Obama’s statements about empathy “included a taxonomy of the kinds of positions with which a judge should be able to empathize,” but other statements
indicated that “Obama’s ideal of judicial empathy seems more comprehensive
in its reach and less specific in its targets”); id. at 275 (“President Obama’s
discussions of empathy, in fact, fluctuated between those that highlighted understanding of particular groups and those that highlighted a posture that
sought to understand the concrete life circumstances of the many kinds of litigants who come before the Supreme Court.”).
67. A tremendous resource in this regard is a website maintained by The
Center for Building a Culture of Empathy that purports to collect all of President Obama’s statements on empathy, in both text and video form. See CENTER FOR BUILDING CULTURE EMPATHY, http://cultureofempathy.com/
Obama/VideoClips.htm ( last visited Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter CULTURE OF
EMPATHY].
68. 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Obama).
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to what is easily defined as interstate commerce, whether a person
who is disabled has the right to be accommodated so they can work
alongside those who are nondisabled—in those difficult cases, the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s heart.69

In fairness, these remarks are perhaps naturally read to
support Professor Kerr’s view that, in the President’s mind, selective empathy for the downtrodden should be the decisive factor in cases where the law is not clear.70 And, independent of
President Obama, some liberals who have called for empathy in
judging seem to have endorsed that very sentiment.71
But one can call for empathy in judging without making
such a radical claim, and I believe that that is what President
Obama meant to do.72 Some years later, in explaining the criteria that would guide his search for a replacement for Justice
Souter, President Obama declared:
I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some abstract legal theory or footnote in a case book; it is also about how our
laws affect the daily realities of people’s lives—whether they can
make a living and care for their families; whether they feel safe in
their homes and welcome in their own nation. I view that quality of
empathy, of understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and
struggles, as an essential ingredient for arriving a[t] just decisions
and outcomes.73

There is nothing in this statement that implies that the
President was searching for a judge who empathizes only with
groups favored by the political left. The President appeared to
reference not only the poor (“whether they can make a living
and care for their families”) and immigrants and minorities
(“whether they feel . . . welcome in their own nation”), but also
69. Id.
70. See also Carrie Dann, Obama on Judges, Supreme Court, FIRST READ
(July 17, 2007, 7:21 PM) http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2007/07/17/
4439758-obama-on-judges-supreme-court (quoting remarks made by thenSenator Obama at a July 17, 2007, Planned Parenthood conference) (“We need
somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it’s like to be a
young teenage mom. The empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor, or
African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old. And that’s the criteria by which
I’m going to be selecting my judges.”).
71. See, e.g., Teresa Bruce, The Empathy Principle, 6 LAW & SEXUALITY
REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 109, 111–13 (1996); see Massaro, supra
note 64, at 2113 (arguing that “the empathy discourse implies a political and
ethical agenda, which involves making choices among competing values or sets
of feeling” and “represents a hope that certain specific, different and previously disenfranchised voices . . . will be heard, and will prevail”).
72. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for Measure),
57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 683, 700 (2009) (“The President has never advocated a
model of pure empathy devoid of law.”).
73. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, supra note 8.
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actual and potential crime victims (“whether they feel safe in
their homes”)—a group that in recent years tends to draw more
empathy from conservatives than from liberals.74 Indeed, several years earlier, President Obama had written that “empathy . . . calls us all to task, the conservative and the liberal, the
powerful and the powerless, the oppressed and the oppressor.
We are all shaken out of our complacency. We are all forced beyond our limited vision.”75 And in an interview with Oprah
Winfrey, he had said that “[e]mpathy doesn’t just extend to
cute little kids. You have to have empathy when you’re talking
to some guy who doesn’t like black people.”76
Recall that empathy is not sympathy77—a point that President Obama himself has made repeatedly.78 Empathy is not
compassion for the oppressed, or for anyone else, for that matter. Nor is it the capacity to feel the emotions of only the downtrodden. It is, rather, the capacity to understand the perspective and feel the emotions of others—all others. President
Obama has reiterated many times that he understands the
“basic idea of empathy” to be exactly that: the ability to “imagine standing in [others’] shoes, imagine looking through their
74. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 937, 942–53 (1985) (discussing the role of victims in American law).
75. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 68 (2006).
76. Oprah Talks to Barack Obama, O, OPRAH MAG., Nov. 2004, at 248,
available at http://www.oprah.com/world/Oprah-Winfrey-Interviews-Barack
-Obama/9. Thus, President Obama insists not only on “depth . . . of . . . empathy”
but also on “breadth of . . . empathy.” 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept.
22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama); cf. President Barack Obama, Remarks at
Student Roundtable, Istanbul, Turkey (Apr. 7, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-Of-President-Barack-Obama
-At-Student-Roundtable-In-Istanbul) (“In the Muslim world, this notion that
somehow everything is the fault of the Israelis lacks balance—because there’s
two sides to every question. That doesn’t mean that sometimes one side has
done something wrong and should not be condemned. But it does mean there’s
always two sides to an issue. I say the same thing to my Jewish friends, which
is you have to see the perspective of the Palestinians. Learning to stand in
somebody else’s shoes to see through their eyes, that’s how peace begins.”);
Newshour with Jim Leher: President Barack Obama Is Interviewed (PBS television broadcast Dec. 23, 2009) (“[O]ne of the things that I think Democrats
and Republicans have to constantly do is try to put themselves in the other
person’s shoes.”).
77. See supra Part III.
78. See, e.g., OBAMA, supra note 75, at 66 (“[E]mpathy . . . is at the heart
of my moral code, and it is how I understand the Golden Rule—not simply as a
call to sympathy or charity, but as something more demanding, a call to stand
in somebody else’s shoes and see through their eyes.”); Barack Obama, Here’s
What It Takes to be a ‘Full-grown’ Man, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2005, at 27 (quoting Obama’s Father’s Day remarks in 2005) (“Not sympathy, empathy.”).
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eyes.”79 A judge who exercises the ability to empathize will
surely do so with the poor, the weak, and the little guy. But she
will also empathize with the rich, the powerful, and the big
guy. An empathic judge will understand the perspective of both
the innocent man who was mistakenly detained by the police
and the police officer who had to make a snap judgment when
lives appeared to be at risk. She will understand the perspective of both the aggrieved insured who was denied coverage for
her loss and the skeptical claims adjustor who was concerned
with avoiding fraud and containing costs. She will understand
the perspective of both the dying patient who was misdiagnosed
and the doctor who was rightly concerned with the costs and
risks of ordering additional tests.
Empathy in judging centers on an ability to truly understand the human dimension of the case—the effects of the
judge’s ruling on all of the people who will be affected by it.
President Obama’s point is not that judges should ignore law in
favor of sympathy, but rather that the ability to render justice
necessitates not only an ability to grapple with complex legal
theories and dense technical footnotes, but also an ability to
“understand[] and identify[] with people’s”—all people’s—
“hopes and struggles.”80
B. THE SECOND CUT: THE PERVASIVE NECESSITY TO
UNDERSTAND THE PERSPECTIVES OF ALL SIDES IN JUDGING
Why is that so? Why must a judge be able to understand
and identify with people’s hopes and struggles in order to accurately dispense justice? The answer to that question circles
back to the bankruptcy of the popular judge-as-umpire analo-

79. CULTURE OF EMPATHY, supra note 67 (scroll down to “2008-08-16Barack Obama Promotes Empathy: Saddleback Civil Forum Presidency”) (quoting then-Senator Obama’s remarks from an election forum on August 16, 2008).
80. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, supra note 8; see
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Case for Empathy, AMERICA MAG. (May 11, 2009),
http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=11649 (noting
that “one can be empathetic toward all sides of a dispute”); Dahlia Lithwick,
Once More, Without Feeling, SLATE (May 11, 2009, 7:15 PM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/05/once_more_without_feel
ing.html (“Empathy in a judge does not mean stopping midtrial to tenderly
clutch the defendant to your heart and weep. It doesn’t mean reflexively giving
one class of people an advantage over another because their lives are sad or
difficult. When the president talks about empathy, he talks not of legal outcomes but of an intellectual and ethical process: the ability to think about the
law from more than one perspective.”).
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gy.81 If the law really were objectively determinate in every
case, and if judging really were a mechanical exercise, then
empathy would have very little role to play in good judging.82 A
computer would be the perfect judge, and computers cannot
empathize.
But the law is not mechanical; judging requires judgment.
And judgment requires empathy. To understand why, we must
explore the nature of the legal doctrine that judges are called
upon to apply.
Susan Bandes, a pioneer in thinking about empathy and
the law, has opined that a “judge uses empathy as a tool toward
understanding conflicting claims. Empathy assists the judge in
understanding the litigants’ perspectives. It does not help resolve the legal issue of which litigant ought to prevail.”83 I disagree. Empathy does help resolve the legal issue of which litigant ought to prevail, because the legal question at issue often
cannot be answered without understanding the way in which
the litigants will be impacted by the decision.
This basic notion is embedded in the very foundation of our
legal system. The entire common law system of judging is
premised on the assumption that “making law in the context of
deciding particular cases produces lawmaking superior to the
methods that ignore the importance of real litigants exemplifying the issues the law must resolve.”84 When it comes to the
federal courts in particular, one of the “‘implicit policies embodied in Article III’”85 is that requiring a genuine case or controversy “tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”86 That
81. See supra Part I.
82. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Op-Ed., Our Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at A27 (“If all judges did was umpire, then judicial
empathy would be irrelevant.”).
83. Bandes, supra note 53, at 137.
84. Schauer, supra note 17, at 883. Indeed, the common law system is
centered around the concept of reasoning by analogy, and a judge cannot determine whether one litigant or injury is sufficiently like another without being able to empathize with each litigant. See Robin West, The Anti-Empathic
Turn, NOMOS (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2–4), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1885079.
85. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
96 (1968)).
86. Id.
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is to say, Article III’s case or controversy requirement—and the
justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, ripeness, and the
rule against advisory opinions that stem from it—are grounded
in substantial part in the notion that real-world context matters. Judges should not decide legal and constitutional issues in
the abstract because they will arrive at better answers if they
have a genuine appreciation of the ways in which the law affects real people.
Indeed, across the broad spectrum of constitutional law
(and, more generally still, all law), the legal doctrine that has
been built upon this foundation requires judges to gain an empathic appreciation of the case from the perspective of all of the
litigants.
1. Constitutional Law
Let us begin with an obvious recent example.87 In Safford
Unified School District v. Redding, the Supreme Court was
called upon to determine “whether a 13-year-old student’s
Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected
to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting
on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school.”88 Under established Fourth Amendment doctrine, determining the constitutionality of searches by school officials requires “a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests”; a school
search “will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction.”89 Thus, in order to resolve the constitutional issue, the Justices had to ascertain the
extent to which the search was “intrusive” to the student. To do
that, they needed to be able to empathize with her—to understand how the search would have felt to her and the impact
that it would have had upon her. In an interview, Justice Ginsburg said that she had been worried that her all-male colleagues would not be up to the task. “They have never been a
13-year-old girl,” she lamented. “It’s a very sensitive age for a

87. See Bandes, supra note 53, at 143–44 (discussing this example).
88. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (2009).
89. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985).
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girl. I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite
understood.”90
Resolving the Fourth Amendment issue also required the
Justices to empathize with the school administrators who ordered the search. One cannot, after all, “balanc[e] governmental and private interests”91 without a full appreciation of the
extent of the government’s interest. Thus, at oral argument,
Justice David H. Souter tried to see the case from the perspective of the school principal:
The principal says, I know as a matter of reliable fact that one student got sick, violently sick, within the past week or so on some pill;
we don’t know exactly what it was. We also know within a reasonable
period of time from where we are now that there have been kids who
died from ingesting dangerous drugs. I’ve got suspicion that some
drug is on this kid’s person. My thought process is I would rather
have the kid embarrassed by a strip search . . . than to have some
other kids dead because the stuff is distributed at lunchtime and
things go awry. . . . Is that thought process, that reasoning, the basis
for a . . . reasonable strip search?92

Only after seeking to fully understand the impact of the search,
or of a decision not to search, on all of the relevant parties, could
the Court determine whether the search was constitutional.
Accordingly, this was not a case of the Justices choosing
empathy over the law. It was instead a case of the Justices using the essential tool of empathy in order to determine the
proper application of the law to the facts at hand. The Court
could not possibly have done a good job in deciding which party
should win under the law without first seeking to understand
the perspective of each party. Failure to do so—to fully and
successfully empathize with either the student or the administrator—could have resulted in a bad decision. To understand
and appreciate the student’s interest, but not the principal’s, or
vice versa, would be to give insufficient weight to one side of
the scale, which would improperly tip the balance in favor of
one party or the other, quite possibly in a dispositive manner.

90. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY,
(Oct. 5, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/
2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N.htm.
91. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
92. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–49, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 1064200 (question of
Justice Souter).
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This same point can be made about virtually any Fourth
Amendment case, as the Fourth Amendment necessitates this
sort of empathic balancing.93
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the
reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests.94

In addition, to determine whether a “search” has occurred,
the court must determine whether “the government violate[d] a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”95 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, the
court must determine whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.”96 To determine
whether a police officer had a “reasonable suspicion” sufficient
to justify a Terry stop, the court must determine whether the
officer had a “reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety.”97
And so on. None of these determinations can sensibly be made
without an ability to empathize with, and understand the
thought processes of both, the police officer and the accused. To
take just one example, it is impossible to determine whether a
passenger should have felt entitled to refuse to cooperate with
police officers who entered the bus on which he was riding, stationed officers on each end of the bus, and then walked down
the aisle searching passengers and luggage,98 without attempting to put oneself into the shoes of the passenger.
Indeed, in the just-decided case of J.D.B. v. North Carolina,99 the need for empathy in Fourth Amendment decision
making took center stage. After noting that a judge, in deter93. See Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1649 (noting protections under the
Fourth Amendment would be altered without judicial empathy); Susan Bandes,
Why is Empathy Controversial? Or Liberal?, BALKINIZATION (May 25, 2009, 9:48
AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/why-is-empathy-controversial-or-liberal
.html (“To resolve the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court must determine
how intrusive the search was, how important the government interest was,
and whether the government adopted a reasonable means of addressing its
concern. To do that, it first has to understand what’s at stake for all the litigants. That’s where empathy plays a role.”).
94. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
96. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
97. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
98. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 194 (2002).
99. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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mining whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of
Miranda v. Arizona,100 must consider whether a reasonable
person in the suspect’s shoes would have felt free to leave,101
the Court held that the judge must take the suspect’s age into
account in making that determination.102 In his dissent, Justice
Samuel A. Alito acknowledged that the Court’s holding requires
judges to “attempt to put themselves in the shoes of the average 16-year-old, or 15-year-old, or 13-year-old, as the case may
be.”103 He lamented the difficulty of “a 60-year-old judge attempting to make a custody determination through the eyes of
a hypothetical, average 15-year-old. Forty-five years of personal
experience and societal change separate this judge from the
days when he or she was 15 years old. And this judge may or
may not have been an average 15-year-old.”104
The Fourth Amendment is surely the most obvious example of the need for this type of judicial empathy, but there is in
fact nothing unique about the Fourth Amendment in this regard. As Chemerinsky reminds us, “Reasonableness issues
arise in countless areas of constitutional law.”105
Consider the law of abortion rights. Under Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, regulations of pre-viability abortions may
not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to choose an
abortion.106 “Casey, in short, struck a balance. The balance was
central to its holding.”107 A judge cannot strike that balance in
any given abortion case without empathizing with the woman,
trying to understand, from her perspective, the extent to which
the regulation burdens her right to choose. A judge must “assess the effects of waiting periods, counseling mandates, and
laws regulating the practice of abortion providers from a contextualized, fact-sensitive perspective that incorporates the real
life circumstances of the girls and women actually impacted by
these laws.”108 The judge must empathize with the woman’s
hopes, concerns, and fears. Thus, for instance, the Court in Casey itself struck down a spousal-notification requirement after
100. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
101. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402.
102. See id. at 2406.
103. Id. at 2416 (Alito, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 1070.
106. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
107. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).
108. Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond, 15 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L., 469, 488 (2009).
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finding that many women “fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands, including verbal harassment,
threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the abortion to family and friends.”109
“We must not,” concluded the Court, “blind ourselves to the fact
that the significant number of women who fear for their safety
and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from
procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had
outlawed abortion in all cases.”110
These sorts of “[b]alancing tests pervade constitutional
law,”111 from the Dormant Commerce Clause test that a nondiscriminatory state regulation “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits,”112 to the executive privilege
mandate for judges to “weigh the importance of the general
privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in
performance of the President’s responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal
justice.”113 Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
claims turn on a balancing of the severity of the offense with
the severity of the sentence to determine whether the sentence
imposed on the offender is disproportionate to the harm inflicted on society114—an inquiry that generally necessitates em109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893.
110. Id. at 894.
111. Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 55, 81 (2006); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 943–45 (1987) (arguing that
“balancing” as a “form of constitutional reasoning” has “become widespread, if
not dominant, over the last four decades” and that “balancing has transformed
constitutional adjudication and constitutional law”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard
Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961,
963 (1998) (noting that “constitutional law today is dominated by the phenomenon of ‘balancing’”); Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural
Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1179 (1998) (noting the “innumerable
‘balancing’ tests [used] throughout constitutional law”). In the Supreme
Court’s own words, “[t]he fact is that, regardless of the terminology used, the
precise content of most of the Constitution’s civil-liberties guarantees rests
upon an assessment of what accommodation between governmental need and
individual freedom is reasonable.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643–
44 (1987).
112. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
113. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711–12 (1974).
114. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286–90 (1983) (holding that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which a defendant is
convicted).

2012]

JUDICIAL EMPATHY

1971

pathic understanding of the burden imposed on the offender,115
and sometimes of the harm imposed upon the victim as well.116
First Amendment freedom of expressive association claims require the Court to “balance the strength of the associational interest in resisting governmental interference with the state’s
justification for the interference,” which among other factors,
“require[s] an assessment of . . . the strength of the associational interests asserted and their importance to the plaintiff.”117
The
question of whether speech of a government employee is constitutionally protected expression necessarily entails striking a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.118

Government restrictions on speech in a limited public forum must be “reasonable,”119 as must government actions that
interfere with the obligation of contracts.120 Public school officials can restrict student expression if “their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,”121 and
time, place, and manner and other content-neutral restrictions
on speech are unconstitutional if they “unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”122 Sixth Amendment in115. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (“We can
now give graphic description of Weems’s sentence . . . . No circumstance of
degradation is omitted. It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted.
He must bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as
hard labor.”).
116. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814 –15 (1991) (allowing
the jury to consider, in a case in which defendant killed a mother and her
daughter, testimony from the victim’s mother regarding the words of the victim’s three-year-old son who survived the attack: “‘He cries for his mom. He
doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t come home. And he cries for his
sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and asks me,
Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m worried
about my Lacie.’”).
117. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y.,
502 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
118. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
119. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (explaining that government entities have a limited ability to regulate private
speech in public forums).
120. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934)
(explaining that legislative action which affects contracts must address a legitimate end, and the action must be “reasonable and appropriate to that end”).
121. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
122. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
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effectiveness of counsel cases turn on whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”123
Prisoner suits challenging the deprivation of the rights turn on
whether the prison regulation is reasonable in light of “legitimate penological interests.”124 The Due Process Clause necessitates “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”125
Multifactor tests like the International Shoe126 test for personal
jurisdiction require a judge to ascertain and balance, among
other factors, “the burden on the defendant” and “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.”127 The notorious balancing test for procedural due process claims turns on “the extent to which [the recipient of government benefits] may be condemned to suffer
grievous loss, and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest
in summary adjudication,”128 a determination that of course necessitates an empathic understanding of the grievousness of
the beneficiary’s suffering.
Beyond these and other explicit balancing tests, most of
constitutional doctrine turns on the application of the various
levels of scrutiny,129 which are themselves in many respects
“just a tool for arranging the weights in constitutional balancing.”130 The use of that tool often requires empathy, at both the
ends and the means steps of the process.
Evaluation of whether the State’s interest is “compelling”
or “important” within the meaning of strict or intermediate
scrutiny often necessitates judicial appreciation of the feelings
of others. For instance, the Supreme Court has found that diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest in
123. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
124. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
125. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
126. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
127. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
128. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
129. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 542 (3d ed. 2006) (“The levels of scrutiny are . . . extremely important in almost all areas involving individual rights and equal protection.”).
130. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 1071; see also Aleinikoff, supra note
111, at 946 (noting that the inquiry into a “compelling” or “important” state
interest involves balancing); Bhagwat, supra note 111, at 963–65 (explaining
how the tiers of scrutiny, in practice, lead courts to engage in balancing).
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part because obtaining a “critical mass” of minority students
ensures that “underrepresented minority students do not feel
isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”131
Likewise, evaluation of whether the law is “narrowly tailored” or “substantially related” to the State’s interest often requires an empathic understanding of the cost that the regulation imposes on individuals. Thus, for instance, Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s conclusion that school districts must pursue their compelling interests in avoiding racial isolation and
achieving classroom diversity in a way that does not make
school assignments turn on crude racial labels, because “[t]o be
forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”132
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education133 was explicitly grounded in empathy for black children.134 Only by putting themselves in the shoes of the children, and understanding segregation from the emotional perspective of the children, could the Justices conclude that to
“separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”135
Even when it purports to be applying only rational basis
review, the Court at times engages in empathy to determine
whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Usually, that empathy is with the legislators or
government officials who cannot realistically be expected always to draw perfect lines in the course of doling out governmental benefits or burdens.136 Sometimes, the empathy is with
131. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318–19 (2003).
132. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1574, 1593–1609 (1987) (discussing Brown v. Board of Education and empathetic understanding).
135. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
136. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1993)
(“These restraints on judicial review have added force where the legislature
must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing. Defining the class of
persons subject to a regulatory requirement—much like classifying governmental beneficiaries—inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of
the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some
points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, considera-
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those who are harmed by the law. Thus, in Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court found “no legitimate state interest which can justify . . . [the State’s] intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual” to the extent of denying gays and lesbians the
right to sexual intimacy.137 Such a denial strips gays and lesbians of “their dignity as free persons”138 and “demean[s] their
existence.”139 To reach that conclusion, the Court empathized
with gays and lesbians enough to understand their sexual encounters from their emotional perspective, rather than the Justices’ own.140 “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice.”141
Of course, some realms of constitutional doctrine are dominated by doctrinal tests other than the tiers of scrutiny, but
those tests also frequently call for judicial empathy.142 Among
tion. . . . Congress had to draw the line somewhere . . . .” (internal citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955) (“Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or
the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.”
(citations omitted)).
137. 539 U.S. 558, at 578 (2003).
138. Id. at 567.
139. Id. at 578.
140. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1031 (2005) (arguing that earlier Court rulings on gay issues indicated that the Justices
found gay sex to be “disgusting”).
141. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
142. For instance, the shocks-the-conscience test that governs substantive
due process violations by executive officials requires judges to understand the
official’s perspective on the events in question. See Cnty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998) (“While prudence would have repressed the
reaction, the officer’s instinct was to do his job as a law enforcement officer,
not to induce Willard’s lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill. Prudence, that is, was subject to countervailing enforcement considerations, and
while Smith exaggerated their demands, there is no reason to believe that
they were tainted by an improper or malicious motive on his part.”). A judge
must also place herself in the shoes of another in order to determine “whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the
First Amendment into play,” which in turn depends on “whether [a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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the numerous Establishment Clause doctrines, for example, are
the coercion and endorsement tests. The coercion test provides
that “government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”143 To determine whether the
government has done so, a judge must seek to empathize with
those who claim to feel coercive pressure. Thus, for instance,
the Supreme Court has held that allowing clergy members to
offer official prayers as part of a public school graduation ceremony violates the Establishment Clause because it “places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to
stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during
the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle
and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”144 “[F]or
the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner
her conscience will not allow, the injury is . . . real.”145 The
Court reached this conclusion after consciously attempting to
empathize with the affected students, concluding that
“[r]esearch in psychology supports the common assumption
that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their
peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in
matters of social convention.”146
The endorsement test asks “whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of”
religion.147 This too requires a judge to place herself in another
person’s (albeit, a hypothetical reasonable person’s) shoes to try
to understand how that person is impacted by the government’s
action. Only through empathy can the judge determine whether
the government’s action impermissibly “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”148
On top of all of this, psychologists understand empathy as
an essential tool in predicting the behavior of others; to accu143. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
144. Id. at 593.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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rately determine how other people are likely to act in particular
circumstances, one has to first be able to determine how they
would feel in those circumstances.149 A great deal of constitutional doctrine requires judges to do just that. Free speech law,
for example, contains numerous tests that require judges to
predict how listeners will respond to speech. Under the Brandenburg v. Ohio incitement test, a judge may allow the State to
punish “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” only
“where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”150 To apply that test, the judge must put herself into the
shoes of the listeners to evaluate the likelihood that those particular persons would be incited to commit harm upon hearing
those words spoken by that speaker in that manner at that
place and time. Similarly, to apply the Chaplinsky v. N.H.
fighting words test, the judge must understand the perspective
of the listener to determine whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, the speech was “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace.”151
2. Beyond Constitutional Law
The need to empathize in order to properly apply the law
goes well beyond constitutional law. To begin with, common
law decision making is now almost universally understood to be
a form of lawmaking on the part of judges,152 and most observers would recognize that there is at least some aspect of consequentialism embedded in the process of common law judging.
That is to say, at least some of the time, a common law judge
will formulate rules and decide cases based on her sense of
what will, on balance, be best for the parties and for society.153
149. See, e.g., D’Arms, supra note 53, at 1487; Miller, supra note 53, at
1010; Vignemont & Singer, supra note 53, at 439 (discussing the “epistemological role” of empathy—its ability to provide information by helping us to predict the behavior of others).
150. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
151. 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
152. See Schauer, supra note 17, at 885–88; Scalia, supra note 16, at 1176–
77.
153. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 94 (“There are some rules of private law which have been shaped in their creation by public policy, and this,
not merely silently or in conjunction with other forces, but avowedly, and almost, if not quite, exclusively.”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132
(1961) (noting that common law judging is sometimes an indeterminate enterprise that necessitates “striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, be-
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A judge who lacks a taste or talent for empathy will not perform that aspect of her job particularly well. To determine
which rule will be best for society, one needs to understand how
the various members of society will be impacted by, and will respond to, the possible rules.154
On top of that, legal doctrine outside of the constitutional
law arena, every bit as much as constitutional law doctrine, necessitates predicting the behavior of others,155 balancing individual interests,156 and understanding the perspectives of others. Across the entire doctrinal spectrum, public and private,
tween competing interests”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1128 (1990)
(arguing that “judicial instrumentalism, understood as judges formulating,
modifying, and changing legal rules to achieve public policy goals, was characteristic of the common law for centuries”); Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social
Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943) (“The body of the common law is made
up of adjustments or compromises of conflicting individual interests in which
we turn to some social interest, frequently under the name of public policy, to
determine the limits of a reasonable adjustment.”); David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 900 (1996) (“Moral
judgments—judgments about fairness, good policy, or social utility—have always played a role in the common law, and have generally been recognized as
a legitimate part of common law judging.”).
154. Thus, Judge Posner, who elevates consequentialism to the center
stage of judging, should be a champion of empathic judges. See generally Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 683 (2004) (advocating legal pragmatism in judicial decision making); Richard A. Posner,
What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1670 (1990)
(“All that a pragmatic jurisprudence really connotes . . . is a rejection of a concept of law as grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical manipulations of those principles, and a determination to use law as an instrument for social ends.”). But see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
155. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1499, 1499–1500 (1998) (“Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate
predictions about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily. Judges . . . invoke mental models of individual and social behavior whenever they
estimate the desirability of alternative rules, policies, or procedures.”). Consider, as just one example, the law of pretrial detention, which requires a
judge to “determine . . . whether the defendant is likely to flee the jurisdiction
if released,” United States v. Vasconcellos, 519 F. Supp. 2d 311, 317 (N.D.N.Y.
2007), and to predict the future dangerousness of the defendant, see United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
156. See Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 3 & n.14 (1987)
(noting that “balancing has emerged as the jurisprudential model at the center
of the modern Court’s work,” so much so that “the word ‘balance’ or ‘balancing’ . . . appear[s] in 214 of the 473 cases decided in the last three years [ preceding 1987]”); R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial
Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1399 n.104 (2006) (noting that “explicit balancing tests pervade civil and criminal law, constitutional and otherwise”).
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civil and criminal, statutory and common law, our law is littered with “reasonableness” tests in general,157 and “reasonable
person” tests in particular—tests that require judges to assume
the perspective of various actors to determine whether their
behavior was objectively reasonable.158
In addition, mens rea and scienter doctrines routinely require judges to view and seek to understand events from the
perspective of particular individuals.159 This inquiry is some157. See George Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV.
949, 949 (1985) (“We lawyers should listen to the way we talk. If we paused to
listen to our pattern of speech, we would be surprised by some of its distinguishing features. One of the most striking particularities of our discourse is
its pervasive reliance on the term ‘reasonable.’ We routinely refer to reasonable time, reasonable delay, reasonable reliance, and reasonable care. In criminal law, we talk incessantly of reasonable provocation, reasonable mistake,
reasonable force, and reasonable risk.”); id. at 949 n.1 (“The Uniform Commercial Code, the Model Penal Code, and the various restatements couple the adjective ‘reasonable’ and the adverb ‘reasonably’ with over 100 different
words.”); Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
21, 47 (1986) (“Anglo-American law is pervaded by standards that require similar judgments of degree and reasonableness.”). Reasonableness tests infiltrate
all areas of our law, from employment law, to tax law, and everything in between. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112( b)(5)(A) (2009) (requiring employers to
make a “reasonable accommodation” for employee disabilities); Randall S.
Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 846, 856 (2011) (“Courts, for instance, have applied a reasonableness test
to determine for tax purposes whether executive pay is in part a disguised dividend to officers/shareholders.”).
158. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (explaining
that for qualified immunity purposes, a right is “clearly established” if “[t]he
contours of the right . . . [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right”); Smith v. AmSouth
Bank, Inc., 892 So.2d 905, 910 (Ala. 2004) (“[T]he question of foreseeability is
answered by viewing events from the perspective of the defendant charged
with negligence . . . .”); Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 513 (Cal.
2009) (noting that negligence law requires “the trial court . . . [to] specifically
conclude[ ] from the perspective of a reasonable [ person] on the scene, taking
into account the facts and circumstances confronting them, the [ person’s] conduct was objectively reasonable”); Schafer v. State, Dep’t of Insts., 592 P.2d
493, 495 (Mont. 1979) (“Foreseeability is measured on a scale of reasonableness; it is not measured abstractly. . . . [T]he law judges the actor’s conduct in
the light of the situation as it would have appeared to the reasonable man in
his shoes at the time of the act or omission complained of. Not what actually
happened, but what the reasonably prudent person would then have foreseen
as likely to happen, is the key to the question of reasonableness.” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled in part on other grounds by
Estate of Striver v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666 (Mont. 1996).
159. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1993) (“In judging
whether this act—sweeping the lamp off the table—was reckless, the district
court could not use hindsight. The court had to put itself in Jimmy’s shoes at
the moment of the act and then determine whether the act was reckless.”);
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times objective—asking the judge to determine what a reasonable person would have done—but even so, it still requires the
judge to place the reasonable person in the shoes of the actor.160
Other times, the inquiry is a subjective one—requiring the
judge to assume the mindset of the actual actor himself.161 And
sometimes, the judge is expected to do both. Consider the doctrine of self-defense. Some jurisdictions hold that, “[i]n determining whether a defendant has produced sufficient evidence
to show reasonable apprehension of harm, the trial court must
apply a mixed subjective and objective analysis.”162 The subjective component “requires the trial court to place itself in the defendant’s shoes and view the defendant’s acts in light of all the
facts and circumstances known to the defendant.”163 The objective component “requires the court to determine what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have done. The
imminent threat of great bodily harm does not actually have to
be present, so long as a reasonable person in the defendant’s
situation could have believed that such threat was present.”164
Many jurisdictions focus on the subjective inquiry, agreeing
with Holmes that
[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. Therefore . . . it is not a condition of immunity that one in
that situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man
might not think it possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant
rather than to kill him.165

Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex. 1994) (“Determining
whether an act or omission involves extreme risk or peril requires an examination of the events and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at
the time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in hindsight.”).
160. See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 919 A.2d 678, 683 (Md. 2007) (“The requisite mens rea is measured by an objective standard, i.e., could or should a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have foreseen that death would likely ensue as a result of his or her conduct.”).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1133 (10th Cir.
2005) (“[T]his inquiry is entirely subjective, the inquiry is not to be viewed
from the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person, and the mens rea element is not satisfied if Defendant acted through mistake, negligence, carelessness, or belief in an inaccurate proposition.”).
162. State v. Walker, 966 P.2d 883, 885 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921); see also, e.g., People
v. Desmond, 93 A.D.2d 822, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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This inquiry necessitates empathy—a judicial ability to internalize the sense of panic that can overcome a person whose life
may be in danger.166
The defense based on battered women syndrome is a particularly clear example of the need for judicial empathy. To find
(or allow a jury finding) that a woman’s fear of unavoidable
harm was reasonable notwithstanding the fact that her husband was asleep at the time that she killed him, a judge must
understand the fragile emotional state of women who are victims of domestic violence.167 The judge must comprehend the
“psychological reality for battered women,” which appears alien
and counterintuitive to most people.168 Courts have appreciated
that some “women . . . become so demoralized and degraded . . . that they sink into a state of psychological paralysis,”
feel “low self-esteem” and “tremendous feelings of guilt,” and
“literally become trapped by their own fear.”169 “Only by understanding these unique pressures that force battered women to
remain with their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation that being
a battered woman creates, can a battered woman’s state of
mind be accurately and fairly understood.”170
Empathy pervades countless other inquiries that judges
are required to perform. Child custody cases turn in part on the
judge’s evaluation of the best interests of the child, and “there
is no way to consider the best interests of the child without a
consideration of the child’s feelings.”171 Awarding, or evaluating
166. Similarly, the provocation defense typically allows mitigation of murder charges “if the defendant . . . was actually provoked into a heat of passion
and a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would also have been provoked.” CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 7 (2003). The Model Penal Code replaces this test with one that “permits mitigation if the defendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which a reasonable explanation or excuse exists.” Id. at 8. “The MPC explicitly
states that the reasonableness of the defendant’s explanation or excuse must
be determined from the defendant’s perspective.” Id. These inquiries too require empathy. See id. at 248–49.
167. See, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989) (recognizing the value of battered women syndrome evidence to dispel common misconceptions, bolster the woman’s credibility, and establish the reasonableness
of her fear of bodily harm).
168. State v. Daws, 662 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
169. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984).
170. Id.
171. Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following
Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 307 (1996); see, e.g., In re Leo M., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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a jury award of, pain and suffering, mental anguish, or other
forms of intangible damages requires a judge to empathize with
the emotional pain of others.172 The test for whether to grant
temporary or permanent injunctive relief requires the judge to
evaluate the “balance of equities” between the parties,173 which
means that the “court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting
or withholding of the requested relief.”174 Numerous areas of
our law employ “undue hardship” tests that require a judge to
ascertain the burden on a party from that party’s perspective,175
and often necessitate an appreciation of the emotional toll imposed by the conduct at issue.176 The Freedom of Information Act
requires judges to evaluate personal privacy interests and balance them against the public interest in transparency.177
Sexual harassment law requires a determination of whether the plaintiff was humiliated by the defendant’s conduct,178
and whether the employer created an environment that was
“both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.”179 The subjective inquiry obviously necessitates empathy—a journey into the “[p]laintiff’s
253, 259 (1993) (noting that the judge must “explore the minor’s feelings regarding his/her biological parents, foster parents, and prospective adoptive
parents, if any, as well as his/her current living arrangements”).
172. See, e.g., Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir.
1972) (noting that calculating mental anguish damages requires empathy).
173. Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
174. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
175. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006) (imposing an undue hardship
test for the discharge of educational loans in bankruptcy); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)( j) (employing an undue hardship test in religious accommodation);
id. § 12112( b)(5)(A) (imposing undue hardship test in disability accommodation); FED. R. CIV. P. 26( b)(3)(A)(ii) (imposing an undue hardship test in civil
discovery).
176. See, e.g., In re Fahrer, 308 B.R. 27, 36 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (“Another factor which this Court may take into consideration in determining
whether repayment would constitute an undue hardship is the psychological
and emotional impact of the Debtor’s continuing liability for the repayment of
such a large sum of money over such an extended period of time.”).
177. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171
(2004) (declaring that courts must “balance the family’s privacy interest
against the public interest in disclosure” when applying the FOIA provision
that bans disclosure of law enforcement records when disclosure would
amount to “an unwarranted invasion . . . of personal privacy”).
178. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002)
(identifying humiliating nature of discriminatory conduct as a relevant factor).
179. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).
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mind” to understand if she “felt humiliated and upset” and experienced “a loss of self-respect.”180 Similarly, “the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the
circumstances.”181 “[T]hat inquiry requires careful consideration of [how the] behavior . . . is experienced by its target” and
“an appropriate sensitivity to social context.”182 A judge must
therefore assume the often very foreign perspective of someone
in the shoes of the plaintiff.183
This list could go on for pages. Such is the nature of our legal system; it requires judicial empathy to apply legal doctrine.184 That is why the best lawyers write their legal briefs in
a manner that seeks to draw empathy from the judge, using the
fact section to tell a story that helps the judge to see the case
from their client’s perspective.185 This is not to say that empathy is essential in every single case. Surely, one could come up
with a list of cases in which the nature of the doctrinal rules,
the litigants, or the situation at hand renders empathy relatively unimportant. But the fact remains that, across the entire

180. Smith v. Nw. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (10th Cir.
1997).
181. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed. App’x 585, 589 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“The unwelcome ‘chest to breast’ hugs made Boswell feel embarrassed and humiliated, and the jury could conclude that a reasonable woman
in Boswell’s position would have felt the same way.”); United States v. Dowd,
417 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that many courts have held “that
harassment should be analyzed from the perspective of the victim, taking into
account the gender of the plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment”).
184. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 326 (1993) (arguing
that adjudicative decision making requires “the capacity to entertain a point of
view defined by interests, attitudes, and values different from one’s own without actually endorsing it”); Benjamin Zipursky, Note, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103, 1135–37 (1990) (arguing that “certain concepts can only be fully understood from a perspective
that includes empathy and compassion” and “[ b]ecause some of those concepts
are embedded in the law, interpretation of the law requires compassion”).
185. See Elyse Pepper, The Case for “Thinking like a Filmmaker”: Using
Lars von Trier’s Dogville as a Model for Writing a Statement of Facts, 14 LEGAL WRITING 171, 171–73 (2008) (arguing that the best advocacy uses a movielike narrative); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2272
(1989) (arguing that a good narrative creates a persuasive effect); cf. Henderson, supra note 134, at 1592 (noting that lawyers often frame a case with “empathic narratives”).
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spectrum of legal doctrine, empathy is very often essential to
good judging.
3. A Law of Rules?
Of course, not everyone celebrates the current state of our
legal doctrine. One imagines that, to someone like Justice Antonin Scalia, the preceding several pages of this Article would
read like a horror novel: a grotesque parade of everything that
is wrong with American legal doctrine; a hall of fame of subjective doctrinal mushiness that should be purged from the judicial canon forthwith. Justice Scalia has long criticized our law
for relying too much on open-ended balancing tests in lieu of
straightforward, bright-line rules. The rule of law, Justice Scalia insists, calls for a law of rules,186 and thus judges should
make legal doctrines that establish general rules rather than
flexible standards.187 Perhaps if they did so, there would be less
of a need for empathy on the part of the judges who apply those
doctrines.188
Perhaps. But even Justice Scalia acknowledges that we do
not currently live in such a world—to the contrary, “sticking
close to [the] facts, not relying upon overarching generalizations, and thereby leaving considerable room for future judges
is thought to be the genius of the common-law system” in which
we now reside.189 And he further acknowledges that it would be
impossible to purge open-ended standards from the law altogether—“[w]e will have totality of the circumstances tests and
balancing modes of analysis with us forever.”190
What is more, even if we were someday to make the
massive transition to a world driven by rules rather than
standards, judges would still have to make the rules.191 And
that process too requires empathy—at least if it is going to be
done well. That is to say, the shaping of the doctrine, not just

186. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 1175.
187. See id. at 1176–77.
188. Cf. Massaro, supra note 64, at 2110–20 (noting that many advocates of
empathy in the law seek fewer rules and more open-ended standards to allow
individual stories and emotions to dictate decisions).
189. Scalia, supra note 16.
190. Id. at 1187.
191. See id. at 1176 (“For I want to explore the dichotomy between general
rules and personal discretion within the narrow context of law that is made by
the courts.”).
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its application, necessitates empathy.192 Suzanna Sherry explains that legal doctrines
are built on foundational facts: potentially contested factual assumptions that are embedded in the doctrine itself and on which the doctrine is based.193 . . . Whether a particular defendant acted in a particular way out of a particular motive are decisional facts . . . . But the
likelihood of actors in defendant’s position acting in a particular way
or having a particular motive is a foundational fact, and doctrinal
rules—including burdens of proof and standards of review—will be
structured differently depending on whether judges assume a high or
low likelihood.194

These determinations about the likelihood of particular actors
behaving in particular ways or having particular motives must
be based on the judge’s ability to place herself in the shoes of
those actors.195
In addition, the creation of doctrinal rules often involves
“definitional balancing” (as distinct from the “ad hoc balancing”
required by the application of those rules).196 In free speech
192. See Mary Becker, The Passions of Battered Women: Cognitive Links
Between Passion, Empathy, and Power, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 2
(2001) (“Empathy plays crucial roles in both shaping law and affecting outcomes in litigation. . . . The ability or inability to empathize with someone is
often the basis for either recognition or denial of a tort action to redress an injury or of a defense in such an action. Similar points could be made about all
areas of law and hold whether the law is made by judges or by legislators.”).
193. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 145, 146. “Foundational facts are the background facts that are
not explicitly at issue in any particular case; they are the meta-facts on which
the doctrine itself depends.” Id. at 150.
194. Id. at 146.
195. To take just one example, the Supreme Court has based its decisions
to create, and then expand, the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule on predictions about how police officers (and other
actors in the criminal justice system) would likely behave. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995) (“[T]here is no basis for believing that application of
the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a significant effect on
court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been
quashed. Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, they have
no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals from failing
to inform police officials that a warrant had been quashed.”); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (“If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to
a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, therefore,
it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies
of their departments.”).
196. See Aleinikoff, supra note 111, at 948 (arguing that definition balancing sets a “principle of general application”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 77–78 (1997) (discussing
the role of balancing in “the process by which the Court crafts doctrine in the
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law, for instance, the Supreme Court has established a rulesbased framework pursuant to which certain categories of
speech are generally excluded from the scope of the First
Amendment. The Court insists that “the right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem.”197 Which classes of speech
are excluded? Those that “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”198 The
categorical rules—that obscenity, fighting words, child pornography, et cetera, are generally excluded from the scope of the
First Amendment—are themselves the product of judicial balancing of individual and state interests.199 And empathy is, of
course, needed to determine the weight of both the individual’s
interest in speech200 and society’s interest in exclusion.201
first instance”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time:
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942 (1968) (coining the term “definitional” balancing).
197. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (footnotes
omitted).
198. Id. at 572.
199. See Nimmer, supra note 196 (“[T]he Court employs balancing not for
the purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular
case, but only for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the first amendment.”). But see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010) (suggesting, implausibly,
that the excluded categories are determined by history rather than balancing).
200. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ( liberalizing the definition of obscenity in order to ensure that serious literary, artistic, political,
and scientific speech is not censored); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26
(1971) (declining to treat profanity as an excluded category because many
speakers find lyrical beauty in words that others find offensive, and because
often profanity is essential to fully convey one’s emotions). Empathy for speakers is also evinced by the fact that much of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence—including, for instance, the overbreadth doctrine—has been based on
the Court’s evaluation of whether potential speakers would be chilled from
speaking out of fear of liability. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 497 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Our normal practice is to assess ex ante the risk that a standard will
have an impermissible chilling effect on First Amendment protected speech.”).
This inquiry involves placing oneself in the shoes of the speaker and predicting how he would likely behave. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119
(2003) (“We have provided this expansive remedy out of concern that the
threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally
protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal
sanctions. Many persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and
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Even when they are not based on definitional balancing,
good judge-made doctrines are of necessity the product of empathy—either in the sense of understanding the emotional perspective of others, or in the sense of predicting the behavior of
others (which itself is dependent on an ability to understand
the emotional perspective of others).202 Two examples from the
constitutional law arena should suffice to illustrate the point.
First, the Supreme Court based its decision that police officers
are generally not liable to bystanders who were injured during
a high-speed police chase on its ability to empathize with officers who “have obligations that tend to tug against each other. . . . They are supposed to act decisively and to show restraint at the same moment, and their decisions have to be
made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.”203 Second, the Court based its decision
that the executive privilege must generally yield to a criminal
subpoena on the ground that it “cannot conclude that advisers
will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that
such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal
prosecution.”204
In sum, even a law of rules requires judges to make the
rules, and judges cannot make rules competently without empathizing broadly with the potentially affected parties. Moreover, this fundamental reality of judicial lawmaking cannot be
avoided by taking refuge in an allegedly objective judicial phisometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will
choose simply to abstain from protected speech . . . .” (citations omitted)).
201. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758–59 & n.10 (1982)
(adding child pornography to the list of excluded categories because “the use of
children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological,
emotional, and mental health of the child,” in that a “child who has posed for a
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within
the mass distribution system for child pornography” and “the fear of exposure
and the tension of keeping the act secret . . . have . . . profound emotional repercussions” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ( limiting First Amendment protection for
defamation of private figures because of the state interest in “the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood,” an
interest that “reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
202. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
203. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
204. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974).
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losophy. There are those who believe that employing an
originalist interpretive methodology would allow judges to ascertain historically determined constitutional rules without
having to resort to empathy, or any other subjective method of
rulemaking.205 Not so. This issue goes well beyond the scope of
this Article,206 but the bottom line is that originalism does not,
in fact, purge subjectivity from judging. As many originalists
have themselves come to recognize, the constitutional provisions that generate the most litigation are written in such
broad, open-ended terms that their original public meaning is
too general to establish concrete rules of decision.207 Randy
Barnett explains that, “[d]ue to either ambiguity or generality,
the original meaning of the [constitutional] text may not always
determine a unique rule of law to be applied to a particular
case or controversy.”208 Thus, “there is often a gap between abstract or general principles of the kind found in the Constitution and the rules of law that are needed to put these principles
into action;”209 a commitment to original meaning will not dictate particular doctrinal rules. Most constitutional doctrines
supported by originalist judges are therefore “not precisely
mandated by the original meaning of the constitutional text,
but rather, have been invented by judges in an effort to put the
Constitution’s open-ended textual meaning into effect.”210 Even
originalist judges cannot avoid the need to invent legal rules.211
No judge can avoid the need to empathize.

205. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 1183–84.
206. For detailed exploration, see Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage
Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529
(2008), and Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO.
L.J. 713 (2011) [hereinafter New Originalism].
207. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 8 (1999) (“Traditional tools
of interpretive analysis can be exhausted without providing a constitutional
meaning that is sufficiently clear to guide government action. The text may
specify a principle that is itself identifiable but is nonetheless indeterminate
in its application to a particular situation. . . . Alternatively, the principle established by the text may be unclear . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
208. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV.
611, 645 (1999).
209. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 109–10 (2001).
210. New Originalism, supra note 206, at 733.
211. See id. at 749–64 (detailing the profound extent to which the “New
Originalism” fails to dictate rules of constitutional law).
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C. THE THIRD CUT: DIFFERENCES IN THE CAPACITY TO
EMPATHIZE
As Adam Smith noted long ago, no one can empathize perfectly with another’s feelings.212 But scientists have confirmed
that some people are able to come much closer to doing so than
others.213 Simon Baron-Cohen, Professor of Developmental Psychopathology at the University of Cambridge, has developed an
empathy quotient—a means of measuring an individual’s capacity for empathy—and has determined that the population’s
empathic skills can be plotted on a bell curve.214 There are ten
major regions of the brain that are involved in empathy, and
the differences in individuals’ empathic abilities can actually be
documented in neural brain scans.215
212. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS ¶ I.i.4.7 (Oxford Press 1976) (“Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for
what has befallen another, that degree of passion which naturally animates
the person principally concerned. . . . [T]he thought that they themselves are
not really the sufferers, continually intrudes itself upon them; and though it
does not hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what
is felt by the sufferer, hinders them from conceiving any thing that approaches
to the same degree of violence.”).
213. See MARK H. DAVIS, EMPATHY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
46–61 (1996) (arguing for individual psychological profiles concerning empathy); KATZ, supra note 62, at 57 (arguing that empathetic power differs by individual); MORRELL, supra note 53, at 109–15 (noting that studies have found
variation in the capacity to empathize with out-groups); TANIA SINGER &
ERNST FEHR, THE NEUROECONOMICS OF MIND READING AND EMPATHY 9
(2005) (recounting studies that suggest “that there are individual differences
in empathic abilities”); Mark A. Barnett, Empathy and Related Responses in
Children, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 146, 149 (discussing scientific “evidence that young children can differ markedly in their
capacity or willingness to be sensitive and responsive to the feelings of others”); Janet Strayer and Nancy Eisenberg, Empathy Viewed in Context, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 389, 396 (noting that the capacity for empathy may vary across individuals).
214. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 13 (illustrating a quantitative
model of empathy across the population). Baron-Cohen has divided the continuum into seven degrees of empathy. See id. at 16–19. Other scientists have
devised various other scales for measuring empathy. See Jolliffe & Farrington,
supra note 58, at 590, 592 (discussing other scales and proposing and employing a new one).
215. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 19–28, 42–43, 54 –57, 68–71 (noting that functional magnetic resonance imaging has identified ten regions of
the brain that are correlated with empathy; people with low empathic abilities
show less neural activity in these areas); SINGER & FEHR, supra note 213, at 6
(noting that studies have “confirmed that the ability to empathize is heterogeneous across individuals” and can be seen in neural scans); Tom F.D. Farrow,
Neuroimaging of Empathy, in EMPATHY IN MENTAL ILLNESS 201, 201–17 (Tom
F.D. Farrow & Peter W.R. Woodruff eds., 2007) (illustrating the neuroimaging of empathy).
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These disparities appear to be partially determined by genetics216 and other biological factors.217 They are also believed
to stem in substantial part from environmental influences during childhood, including family relationships and parenting
styles, particularly in matters of discipline.218
Studies suggest, however, that one’s empathic abilities are
not completely predetermined by biology and early childhood.219
It seems that those who are willing to work at it can get better
at empathizing.220
Since empathy is an essential tool for good judging, and
since people naturally vary in their empathic abilities, it makes
216. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 86 (concluding “that environmental factors interact with genes for empathy” and that “some genes are associated with your score on various measures of empathy”); id. at 94 (explaining that studies have identified four genes associated with empathy); DAVIS,
supra note 213, at 62–70; id. at 64 (summarizing studies showing that “genetic
factors seem to make a substantial contribution to individual differences in
affective empathy”).
217. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 93 (discussing studies that have
found that testosterone shapes “empathy circuit[s]” in the brains of developing
fetuses, and the more testosterone a fetus generates in the womb, the less empathic the child will end up being); Strayer & Eisenberg, supra note 213.
218. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 47 (noting that “how your mother (or father) treated you turns out to be very important . . . for the development of healthy empathy”); id. at 57; DAVIS, supra note 213, at 70–81; MARTIN
L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING
AND JUSTICE 282 (2000) (noting that empathy “can be destroyed by powerassertive childrearing, diminished by cultural valuing of competition over
helping others, and overwhelmed by egoistic motives within the individual . . . .”); Barnett, supra note 213, at 149–57. See generally ARNOLD P.
GOLDSTEIN & GERALD Y. MICHAELS, EMPATHY: DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND
CONSEQUENCES 12–61 (1985) (discussing the development of empathy).
219. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 120 (noting that “there is already evidence that components of empathy (such as emotion recognition) can
be learned”); GOLDSTEIN & MICHAELS, supra note 218, at 50 (discussing a program that appeared to improve empathic abilities in adolescents); HOFFMAN,
supra note 218 (same); KATZ, supra note 62, at 59–61; Martin L. Hoffman, The
Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment, in EMPATHY AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 47, 69 (arguing that moral education can
overcome empathic biases). This is an area in which more empirical studies
are needed. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 101–02 (discussing therapies, technologies, and even medical treatments that might be effective in increasing empathy); id. at 120 (“These methods only scratch the surface in
terms of what could be tried . . . . Counselling and other psychological therapies such as role-playing techniques purport to be aiming to encourage empathy, and it would be valuable to have systematic studies to show if these are
working. . . . [ I ]t would not be surprising if someone who is slightly below average in their [empathy score] slightly boosted their empathy following
intervention.”).
220. See Miller, supra note 53, at 1010.
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sense that the President should look for judges who possess
strong empathic skills. (Intelligence is also an essential skill for
good judging, and we would hardly fault a President who explicitly seeks smart judges.) And since empathic abilities seemingly can be honed and improved, it makes sense that the President would look for judges who have openly expressed an
interest in empathy.
D. THE FINAL CUT: EMPATHIC BLIND SPOTS
Not only is there variance across the population in general
empathic abilities, but there is also variance within each individual’s ability to empathize, depending on the target of their
empathy. That is to say, we all naturally empathize with some
people more than others. More specifically, there is substantial
“research evidence that observers are more empathic to [persons] who are familiar and similar to themselves than to [persons] who are different.”221
Accordingly, in assigning weight to the interests of the various parties in the course of making or applying legal doctrine,
judges are naturally inclined to empathize with—and thus
place greater value upon—the feelings and interests of those
whose circumstances and experiences most closely resemble
their own. Thus, for instance, studies show that female judges
do not tend to decide cases markedly differently than male
judges, except in the area of sex discrimination.222 When it
221. Hoffman, supra note 219, at 67; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 218, at
283 (“Empathic morality is also subject to biases that favor friends, relatives,
and people similar to oneself.”); Barnett, supra note 213, at 154 (noting that
“[c]hildren have been found to respond more empathically to those who are
perceived as similar to the self than to those who are perceived as dissimilar”);
Lisa M. Brown et al., Affective Reactions to Pictures of Ingroup and Outgroup
Members, 71 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 303–311 (2006) ( presenting results of study
that found that people empathize more with members of their own ethnic
group); Henderson, supra note 134, at 1581 n.35 (noting that children show
more empathy for persons who are like themselves and for people in situations
that they have experienced themselves); Tania Singer et al., Empathic Neural
Responses are Modulated by the Perceived Fairness of Others, 439 NATURE
466, 466 (2006) (noting that neural studies show that, sometimes, people empathize more with persons whom they like than with persons whom they dislike); Vignemont & Singer, supra note 53, at 438 (noting that an important
factor in determining whether a person can empathize with another is whether the would-be empathizer has had experiences similar to those of the other
person); id. at 439 (noting that studies have found that ability to predict the
actions of others through empathy “depends on the similarity between the empathizer’s and the target’s experiential repertoires”).
222. See Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on
Judging, 54 AM. JUR. POL. SCI. 389, 390 (2010).
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comes to that area—and not others—male and female judges,
whose backgrounds tend to be otherwise quite similar, have
starkly different perspectives. Male judges are more naturally
inclined to see the employer’s side, and they have trouble empathizing with the woman’s perspective. Female judges are
naturally more inclined to understand and value the woman’s
perspective, as it more closely resembles their own.
Similarly, and perhaps even more interestingly, preliminary results of a recent study of the voting patterns of federal
appellate judges suggest that judges who have daughters are
significantly more likely to vote in favor of women in cases involving sex discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and reproductive rights than are judges who have sons.223 This effect
persists after controlling for other potentially relevant characteristics, including partisanship, and does not extend to other
categories of cases.224 These results “suggest that the effect
may be due in part to the empathy that parents feel toward
their daughters . . . .”225 A judge with daughters finds it easier
to empathize with the women in these cases; their experiences
and perspectives are more familiar and comprehensible to him
than they are to a judge who does not have daughters.
Everyone, or almost everyone anyway, can empathize with
familiar perspectives. A good judge has to be able to empathize
with unfamiliar ones, too. Key to good judging is both a desire
and an ability to overcome the natural inclination to empathize
more with those whose experiences and circumstances resemble one’s own. To succeed at their jobs, judges must also empathize with those who are most different from and unfamiliar to
them, and whose interests and perspectives they are likely to
naturally undervalue.226
223. See Adam Glynn & Maya Sen, Like Daughter, Like Judge: How Having
Daughters Affect Judges’ Voting on Women’s Issues 28 (Mar. 10, 2011) (working
paper), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/msen/files/judicialdaughters.pdf.
224. Id. (manuscript at 1).
225. Id. (manuscript at 29); see also id. (suggesting that judicial decision
making appears to be driven in part by “empathic connections”).
226. Although this Article does not focus on such a claim, it is worth noting
that there appears to be a “general consensus among scholars in various fields
who have studied emotion” that “reasoning has an emotive aspect.” Susan
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 366 (1996); see also Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural
Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629, 645–48 (2011). “It is
[therefore] incoherent to say that a judge should base an opinion on reason
and not emotion because emotions are an inherent part of decision-making.
Emotions are the process we use to assign value to different possibilities.” Da-
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V. THE INADEQUACY OF THE NON-EMPATHIC,
UMPIRE JUDGE
A judge who believes in the popular portrait of judges as
umpires, and who rejects as illegitimate calls for judicial empathy, will “call ‘em like he sees ’em”—applying the law as he understands it to the facts as he perceives them. What he will fail
to realize is that he is seeing the case from a particular perspective—his own—and is mistaking that perspective for an
unbiased, neutral one. What he views as the disinterested,
“correct” answer will in fact in many close cases just be the contingent answer that he arrives at after unintentionally privileging his own perspective—subconsciously empathizing with
those whose experiences he shares, whose perspective comes
naturally to him, and whose plight strikes a chord with him.
Without meaning to, he will give disproportionate weight to
their interests in his legal calculus and undervalue the interests of those whose perspectives he does not fully appreciate.
All the while, he will claim, and genuinely believe, that he is
being completely neutral—an umpire, just calling balls and
strikes. But in fact, he will tend disproportionately to decide
cases in favor of the parties with whom he most naturally empathizes—usually large corporations, the government, employers, and the like, given the background of most federal judges227
(especially most conservative federal judges, who are the most
likely to endorse umpiring over empathy). This distorts the law.
It is bad judging under a false (and falsely superior) sense of
neutrality and professional excellence.228
vid Brooks, Op-Ed., The Empathy Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A25. If
this is true—that all reasoning, including legal reasoning, necessarily has an
emotional component—then empathy is all the more important to good judging. If a judge cannot help but base her rulings at least in part on her emotional view of the case, then it is essential that she comprehend and feel the
emotional perspective of all of the parties, rather than just the ones with
whom she feels a natural affinity. Cf. Bandes, supra, at 370 (noting that because emotions have a cognitive aspect and can change as we are exposed to
new information and new experiences, if one is empathic, “it may be possible
to mitigate the limitations of one’s own perspective” in forming an emotional
reaction to a case).
227. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
228. Cf. Bandes, supra note 53, at 139–42 (noting the danger of selective
empathy that comes from mistaking one’s own perspective for a neutral and
unbiased one); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society:
Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 410 (1983) (“The real threat that a judge’s personal ideologies may affect his decisions in an inappropriate case arises when the judge
is not even consciously aware of the potential threat.”); McKee, supra note 12,
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Chief Justice Roberts may believe that he “confront[s] every case with an open mind . . . fully and fairly analyz[ing] the
legal arguments . . . and decid[ing] every case . . . according to
the rule of law . . . [and that he simply] call[s] balls and
strikes . . . .”229 But, according to one observer, “[i]n every major
case since he became the nation’s seventeenth Chief Justice,
Roberts has sided with the prosecution over the defendant, the
state over the condemned, the executive branch over the legislative, and the corporate defendant over the individual plaintiff.”230 The Chief Justice thinks that he is umpiring in a neutral fashion, but perhaps he is just subconsciously empathizing
only with those whose experiences and perspectives most closely resemble his own as a former corporate and executive-branch
lawyer.231
Similar concerns can be raised about Justice Scalia, at
least some of the time. Justice Scalia is acutely aware of the
danger “that the judges will mistake their own predilections for
the law,” and he believes that “[a]voiding this error is the hardest part of being a conscientious judge.”232 Yet his jurisprudence evinces a tendency to empathize only with those like
himself, which sometimes leads him to commit the very error
that he takes pride in avoiding.
Consider Lee v. Weisman, in which the Supreme Court
held, over Justice Scalia’s dissent, that allowing clergy members to offer official prayers as part of a public school gradua-

at 1712 (“The umpire metaphor obscures the reality of personal bias. Getting
beyond that bias is extremely difficult even for the most introspective and sincere judge.”); Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality, Statu, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary Citizens),
80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 49 (1996) (noting that, if judges fail to empathize with all
parties, their decisions will tend to reflect the values of the segments of society
from which they themselves have been drawn); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at
1649 (“It is those judges who are unable to understand the views and problems
of others—who are unable to assess problems from any vantage point other
than their own—who may not be up to the task of administering justice equally and impartially.”).
229. Roberts Hearing, supra note 7, at 56.
230. Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, NEW YORKER (May 25, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin.
231. For a similar charge against Justice Alito, see Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2011, at MM13. Bazelon cites instances
of Alito’s opinions evincing empathy for military families and white men, but
argues that “Alito’s sense of empathy never seems to involve an act of imagination; it rarely extends to people who are not like him.” Id.
232. Scalia, supra note 32.
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tion ceremony violates the Establishment Clause.233 The
Court’s majority opinion was grounded in a conscious attempt
to empathize with students who practice a minority religion (or
no religion) and suffer emotional injury from the school’s conduct.234 In his dissent, Justice Scalia utterly failed to understand or appreciate those interests, derisively labeling the injury as nothing more than “minimal inconvenience.”235 He was
oblivious to the fact that, for a nonbeliever or a practitioner of a nonJudeo-Christian religion, the harm of having either to participate in a
prayer that runs counter to one’s core religious beliefs or to be stared
at and ostracized for not doing so is a very serious one—especially to a
teenager trying to fit in and find acceptance in a world in which she is
already an outsider.236

Justice Scalia cast his lot instead with the members of the majority who, like him, enjoy prayer, and who will now be precluded from hearing biblical prayer at future graduations:
“[N]othing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among
religious believers of various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship and seek.”237 Seeking to
balance the interests of both sides, Justice Scalia found that
the interests of those whose values and experiences matched
his own—whose perspective he understood and shared—easily
trumped the interests of those whose emotional struggles he
made no effort to appreciate:
The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and inspiring prayers . . . on this official and patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be
replicated. To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal
inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law. 238

More than a decade later, Justice Scalia did it again, this
time in the course of voting to uphold a Ten Commandments
monument in a public courthouse. He correctly noted that, “in
the context of public acknowledgments of God there are legiti233. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
234. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
235. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice
Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1120 (2006).
237. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recounting “the
personal interests on the other side”).
238. Id. at 646.
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mate competing interests.”239 But he then went on to place vanishingly little value on the interests of those with whom he has
no natural tendency to empathize (“[o]n the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling ‘excluded’”) and to place
great value on the interests of those whose plight he shared
(“but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as a people, and with respect to our national endeavors.”)240 A Christian himself, he seemed “blind to the fact that
nonmonotheists suffer serious alienation when their government erects and endorses ‘as a people’ a religious monument
that explicitly rejects and condemns nonmonotheists’ deeply
held beliefs and practices.”241
Another example of Justice Scalia’s empathic limits is his
declaration in California v. Hodari D. that it “contradicts proverbial common sense” to suggest that, as a matter of Fourth
Amendment law, “it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief
inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police.”242 As Tracey Maclin has noted, “From a police
perspective, Justice Scalia’s remarks may make sense.”243 A police officer might be inclined to believe that someone who runs
away at his approach must be hiding something. But “this
viewpoint never considers that Hodari, a black youth, may have
had alternative reasons for wanting to avoid the police.”244 In
light of numerous reports of police officers harassing, harming,
or humiliating black youths in random stops, from the perspective of the youth, it might have made perfect sense to run away
even if he had nothing to hide.
Justice Scalia may think that an approaching officer only wants to
ask “What’s going on here?” A black youth, however, may have had a
different experience on the street and may believe that the approaching officer is out to administer a little “street justice” of the type recently documented in Boston and Los Angeles.245
239. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
240. Id. Justice Scalia claimed that the balance between those interests
was dispositively struck by the framers, and by “[o]ur national tradition.” Id.
That claim is dubious. See Colby, supra note 236, at 1126–38.
241. Colby, supra note 236.
242. 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991).
243. Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 748 n.110 (1992).
244. Id. at 749 n.110.
245. Id.; see also DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES
AND THE POLICE: CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA 120 (1969) (“Our data have
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The fact that Justice Scalia issued this tone-deaf opinion just a
month after the entire “nation watched in horror as the videotape depicting the brutal beating of Rodney King, an African
American man, at the hands of more than a dozen white Los
Angeles police officers played over and over on television
screens across the country”246 is a testament to his diminished
skill for empathy. Because he empathized only with the police
officer, his balancing of the interests—his reasonableness calculation—failed to give fair consideration to the suspect’s interest.
VI. THE IDEAL EMPATHIC JUDGE
When liberals call for judicial empathy, they do so because
they believe that there is a better alternative. To be sure, liberals, every bit as much as anyone else, want judges who are supremely smart and accomplished—the cream of the crop. We all
want judges with top-notch legal reasoning skills and unparalleled expertise in analyzing and working with complex statutes,
regulations, and precedents. We all want our judges to be talented technocrats with razor-sharp legal minds.
A. BROAD EMPATHY, NOT NARROW SYMPATHY
Liberals also insist on judges who are impartial and who
decide cases based solely on the law. If empathy were sympathy,247 then conservatives would be right that its role in judging
should be extremely limited.248 Good judges will often feel genuinely sorry for a litigant while at the same time concluding
that the law does not favor him.249 Any judge who determines
shown that minority people carry into contacts with the police more negative
expectations than do [whites]. One important result of these attitudes is the
generation of a strong disposition to avoid the police.”); Tracey Maclin, “Black
and Blue Encounters” Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment
Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 276 (1991).
246. Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in
Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 147, 148.
247. See supra Part III (explaining the difference between empathy and
sympathy).
248. Sympathy might play a legitimate role in criminal sentencing. See
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 258 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the
judgment) (“Discretion to be compassionate or harsh is inherent in the sentencing scheme . . . .”).
249. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 202–03 (1989) (noting that judges “are moved by natural sympathy in a
case like this to find a way” for the aggrieved party to be compensated, yet
they are compelled to follow the law); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–
21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The hard fact is that sometimes we must
make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in

2012]

JUDICIAL EMPATHY

1997

that the law favors—even if only slightly—one party, and yet
rules for the other party is behaving lawlessly.250 By the same
token, H. Jefferson Powell gets it exactly right when he condemns
those who are happy to maintain the trappings of legal argument on
the understanding, shared among those in the know, that the real determinants of constitutional decision have nothing to do with the law.
This is no mere impoverishment of law; it is the negation of law. Put
into action, it is a betrayal: a judge who thinks legal reasoning is
nothing more than a rationalization for decisions reached on other
grounds, and yet announces those decisions in the name of the Constitution, acts in bad faith. Such decisions may enjoy raw institutional
power but they are lawless, as our tradition has understood law. 251

That is emphatically not what good judging entails. To the
extent that there are or have been liberal judges who behave
this way,252 or liberal academics who endorse this behavior,
they do a disservice to liberalism and to the rule of law. A call
for empathy in judging is not a call to decide cases on the basis
of sympathy, or anything else other than law.253
the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result.”).
250. See Zipursky, supra note 184, at 1123–28 (arguing that concerns for
the separation of powers and the rule of law do not permit a judge to choose a
weaker, but still legally plausible, argument over a stronger argument based
on sympathy, nor do they even permit judges to use sympathy as a “tiebreaker” to choose between arguments whose strength is in equipoise).
251. H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not an Originalist,” 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 259, 280 (2010).
252. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 41, at 164 (recounting the recollections of
a former D.C. Circuit law clerk whose judge allegedly told him, “This is how
we go about our work: We learn the facts of the case, then we think long and
hard about the fair outcome, the equitable disposition, the just result. Finally,
we go find the law to support our conclusion”); Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 755–56 (1995) (describing an
anecdote about Justice Abe Fortas who drafted an opinion consisting of unsupported policy conclusions and then told his law clerk to “[d]ecorate it” with
citations to legal authorities and suggesting that Fortas had been influenced
by “the Yale legal realists who were his mentors and friends” to believe that
“invocations of ‘the law’ were merely facades for policy preferences” and thus
that, “[a]s a judge, . . . he had no need to work through what the law required
before he arrived at a judgment”) (citing LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 18, 271–72, 274 (1990)); cf. Tim Wells, Legends in the Law: A Conversation with Peter B. Edelman, WASH. LAW., Apr. 2008, at 29, 31 (recounting
the recollection of a former law clerk that Justice Arthur J. Goldberg’s “first
question in approaching a case always was, ‘What is the just result?’ Then he
would work backward from the answer to that question to see how it would
comport with relevant theory or precedent”).
253. See Henderson, supra note 134, at 1576 (rejecting the notion that empathy and the rule of law “are mutually exclusive concepts”); Catherine Gage
O’Grady, Empathy and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable William C.
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A call for empathy in judging is instead a claim that judges
need more than just smarts, experience, expertise, and impartiality.254 To be sure, in the vast majority of cases, those skills
will be enough to get the job done. In most routine cases, the
law (and the proper application of the law to the facts at hand)
is so clear that every minimally competent and honest judge
would reach the same result. The scales are so far from equipoise that it would be virtually impossible for a smart and conscientious judge to come up with the wrong balance. President
Obama was right that “adherence to legal precedent and rules
of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95
percent of the cases that come before a court, so that both a
Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at the same place most of the
time on those 95 percent of the cases.”255 But President Obama
was also right that, in the other five percent of cases, “adherence to precedent and rules of construction and interpretation
will only get you through the 25th mile of the marathon,”256 in
the sense that different judges could reach different results on
the basis of a sincere attempt to apply the governing law.257
Because of the nature of both law application and lawmaking in our judicial system,258 in order to successfully traverse
that last mile—to definitively and fairly strike the close balance—judges also need an ability to understand the issue from
the perspective of all of the parties, and to fully comprehend
and appreciate the implications and impact of their rulings on

Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4, 10 (2001) (“Although empathy is sometimes
used interchangeably with compassion, sympathy, and pity, empathy as a
component of judicial decisionmaking does not mean experiencing sympathy or
pity for another and allowing that sympathy to shape an outcome.”); Sophie H.
Pirie, John T. Noonan as Judge: What Can Empathic Judging Mean for Women?, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 541, 544 (1996).
254. Cf. BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 53 (noting that empathy and IQ
are independent of each other); id. at 123 (“[ W ]hen it comes to problem solving, clearly many situations require both logic and empathy. They are not mutually exclusive.”); Jolliffe & Farrington, supra note 58, at 604 ( presenting the
results of a study that found very little correlation between intelligence and
empathy).
255. 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Obama).
256. Id.
257. See Kagan Hearings, supra note 10, at 203 (“But we do know that not
every case is decided 9-0, and that is not because anybody is acting in bad
faith. It is because those legal judgments are ones in which reasonable people
can reasonably disagree sometimes.”).
258. See supra Part IV.B.
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all parties (and nonparties).259 They need a talent for empathy.260
Thus, Justice Kagan was spot-on at her confirmation hearings when she responded to a question about President
Obama’s call for empathy in judging by saying that, although
she did not “want to speak for the president,” and did not
“know what the president was speaking about specifically,” she
did
think that in approaching any case a judge is—is required really, not
only permitted, but required to think very hard about what each party is saying, to try to see that case from each party’s eyes, in some
sense to think about the case in the best light for each party, and then
to weigh those against each other.261

259. See Interview with President Barack H. Obama (C-SPAN broadcast
May 23, 2009), available at http://www.c-span.org/pdf/obamainterview.pdf (“I
said earlier . . . that I thought empathy was an important quality and I continue to believe that. You have to have not only the intellect to be able to effectively apply the law to cases before you. But you have to be able to stand in
somebody else’s shoes and see through their eyes and get a sense of how the
law might work or not work in practical day-to-day living.”); see also supra
Part IV.A.
260. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 86–90 (1995) (arguing
that judges must apply neutral principles and be nonpartisan, but at the same
time they must “develop as rich and comprehensive an understanding as possible of the situation of the groups involved in the case”); Bandes, supra note
53, at 137 (“In the context of judicial decision-making, empathy is an essential
capacity for understanding what’s at stake for the litigants. Ideally, a judge
will have the capacity to put herself in the shoes of all those with a stake in
her ruling.”); D’Arms, supra note 53, at 1494 –95 (“It is surely only reasonable
to grant that judgments we make after seeing what things feel like from several such points of view are ipso facto better judgments.”); Jerome Frank,
Corbin on Contracts Volume Three, 61 YALE L.J. 1108, 1112 (1952) ( book review) (“[T]he judicial judge . . . should be . . . quick with empathy, the capacity
to feel himself into the minds and moods of other men.”) ( paraphrasing Arthur
Corbin); Massaro, supra note 64, at 2107 (noting that “an empathic person will
better ‘hear’ all stories—that is, ‘both sides’—than one who heeds only one
voice”); Thomas Morawetz, Empathy and Judgment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
517, 523 (1996) (noting that empathy is a “second-order emotion[ ]”—a “mode[ ]
of being in touch with the emotions, feelings, expectations, and vulnerabilities
of others”: “What we expect from judges is not the experience of first-order
emotions—such as fear, love, anger, distress—but the capacity to make morally significant decisions in the light of empathy with the first-order emotions of
others.”); O’Grady, supra note 253, at 12 (advocating empathy in judicial decision making by which “a judge will seek to learn about a case by engaging in
conceptual perspective taking and the active process of imagining another’s
situation”); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1648 (“A judge’s work requires a capacity to understand the challenges faced by a wide range of potential litigants
from across the spectrum of our society.”).
261. Kagan Hearings, supra note 10, at 103 (testimony of General Kagan).
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In other words, “the judge is required to give consideration
to each party, to try to figure out what the case looks like from
that party’s point of view, that’s an important thing for a judge
to do.”262 Still, Justice Kagan took pains to emphasize, “at the
end of the day, what the judge does is . . . apply the law.”263
“You are looking at law all the way down, not your political
preferences, not your personal preferences.”264
There is nothing extralegal or inappropriate about judicial
empathy—certainly nothing that led conservatives to object
when Justice Clarence Thomas testified at his confirmation
hearings,
I believe Senator, that I can make a contribution, that I can bring
something different to the Court, that I can walk in the shoes of the
people who are affected by what the Court does. . . . I say to myself
almost everyday, “But for the grace of God, there go I.”265

And certainly nothing that led conservatives to object when
Justice Alito testified as his confirmation hearings that, when
he hears an immigration case, he says to himself, “You know,
this could be your grandfather, this could be your grandmother.
They were not citizens at one time, and they were people who
came to this country.”266 And when he hears a case involving
children, he “can’t help but think of [his] own children and
think about [his] children being treated in the way the children
may be treated in the case that’s before [him].”267 Alito continued, “[a]nd that goes down the line. When I get a case about
discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 203. That Justice Kagan properly captured the essence of President Obama’s views is supported by the fact that President Obama spoke of
empathy as “an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions” in the same
breath in which he claimed that he will “seek somebody who is dedicated to
the rule of law” and “who respects the integrity of the judicial process and the
appropriate limits of the judicial role.” Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, supra note 8.
265. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 260 (1991) (testimony of Judge Thomas); see also JEFFREY TOOBIN,
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 104 –05 (2007)
(“Being an RVer helps me do my job better. . . . The world I live in is very cloistered. The bulk of my adult life has been spent in Washington, D.C. RVing allows me to get out and see the real America.” (quoting Justice Thomas’s remarks to the Recreational Vehicle Industry Association in 2004)).
266. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 333 (2006) (testimony of Judge Alito).
267. Id. at 475.
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who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background
or because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that
into account.”268
Empathy of this sort is not only appropriate; it is essential.269 And given that some people are naturally better at it
than others,270 we should seek judges who have evinced a proclivity for empathy, just as we want judges who have proven
themselves to be intelligent. And given that people apparently
can improve their empathic skills,271 we should seek judges
who have expressed an interest in, and a commitment to, empathy.
B. OVERCOMING EMPATHIC BLIND SPOTS
A skeptic would certainly be warranted in asking why, if
empathy in judging just means seeing and appreciating the
human element of the case from all sides, does President
Obama focus so much on empathy for particular groups?272
Why does he say that he is specifically looking for someone
with the “empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor, or
African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old?”273
The answer stems from the problem of empathic blind
spots.274 All judges—unless they are psychopaths275—will invariably empathize to some degree with at least some of the
parties before them. It would be impossible to even try to balance equities or interests if a judge did not at least subconsciously appreciate another’s perspective. But everyone has a
tendency to empathize more with those who are most like
them—with those whose perspectives, experiences, and situa268. Id.; see Bandes, supra note 53, at 137–38 (noting that Justices Thomas
and Alito indicated that they “both intend to uphold the rule of law and are
capable of empathy for those less fortunate”).
269. See supra Part IV.B.
270. See supra Part IV.C.
271. See supra Part IV.C.
272. See supra Part IV.A.; cf. David Limbaugh, Sotomayor, Reverse Empathy and the Rule of Law, TOWNHALL (May 27, 2009 http://townhall.com/
columnists/davidlimbaugh/2009/05/27/sotomayor,_reverse_empathy_and_the_
rule_of_law/page/full/ ( paraphrasing President Obama: “Forget what I just
said about how judges should interpret, not make, the law. I want my judges
to have empathy. And don’t tell anyone, but when I say ‘empathy,’ that’s code
for bending the law to achieve the results I want based on the selective empathy I have for certain victimized groups.”).
273. Dann, supra note 70 (quoting Barack Obama).
274. See supra Part IV.D.
275. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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tions are most like their own. Federal judges tend to come from
certain backgrounds. They are likely to have privileged upbringings, elite educations, and professional experience as
prosecutors, government attorneys, or corporate lawyers.276 As
such, they will subconsciously tend to empathize with the powerful, the elites, and the insiders. President Obama wants to
make sure that he appoints judges who can also empathize
with those whose experiences tend to be very far afield from
those of most judges.277 Only then will the courts properly
weigh unfamiliar interests in the greater calculus of the law.
Of course, one way to seek to ensure that the interests of
other groups will be understood and valued in the courts is to
seek to ensure that more members of those groups are given
the opportunity to serve as judges. Since they, too, will naturally tend to empathize more with people like themselves, the judiciary will take their interests into account in decision making
simply by giving them a seat on the bench. That is indeed the
motivation behind much of the call for greater diversity in the
judiciary.278
276. See, e.g., Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the
Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 839 (1998) (noting that many judges come from privileged backgrounds and attended elite schools); Susan Haire et al., An
Intercircuit Profile of Judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 78 JUDICATURE
101, 102–03 (1994) ( providing data that show that a high percentage of federal
appellate judges have prior prosecutorial experience and attended elite law
schools); Rorie L. Spill Solberg & Kathleen A. Bratton, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Presidential Patterns, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 119, 124 –25 (2005) ( providing
data that show that more than a third of federal district judges attended Top15 law schools and close to half of federal district judges have prior prosecutorial experience, whereas only a tiny percentage have worked in legal aid, civil
rights, or civil liberties organizations).
277. Thus, when President Obama lists downtrodden groups with whom he
wants judges (and everyone for that matter) to empathize, he emphasizes that
he lists those groups because they are different from us, and we cannot understand their struggles while wearing our own shoes. See, e.g., CULTURE OF EMPATHY, supra note 67 (quoting Obama’s remarks at a Campus Progress Conference on July 7, 2006, in which he argues for the need to close the “empathy
deficit” by acquiring “the ability to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes; to
see the world through those who are different from us—the child who’s hungry, the laid-off steelworker, the immigrant woman cleaning your dorm
room”).
278. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 411 (2000)
(“[D]iversity on the bench . . . encourages judicial impartiality, by ensuring
that a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial decision-making.”);
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Representative Government, Representative Court?
The Supreme Court as a Representative Body, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1252, 1253

2012]

JUDICIAL EMPATHY

2003

In fact, there are some skeptics out there who doubt that
members of majority groups will ever successfully empathize
with the powerless,279 and who therefore believe that diversity
is the only solution to the problem of unconsciously biased judging in favor of the majority. Justice Sotomayor made her infamous “wise Latina” remark in the context of arguing that,
while “we should not be so myopic as to believe that others of
different experiences or backgrounds are incapable of understanding the values and needs of people from a different
group,” the fact of the matter is that, “to understand takes time
and effort, something that not all people are willing to give. For
others, their experiences limit their ability to understand the
experiences of others. Others simply do not care.”280 Thus,
there is a need for greater diversity on the bench.281
Diversity is indeed important, but not just because it can
substitute for empathy. More importantly, it can facilitate empathy. It does not just mitigate the damage caused by empathic
blind spots; it actually helps to eliminate those blind spots altogether. The presence of some judges with different life experiences can help to ensure that other judges—their colleagues—
are exposed to different perspectives and can properly comprehend and appreciate interests and struggles that are beyond
their own realms of experience.282 To take the most famous example, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s experiences with segregation and discrimination surely influenced his own voting. But
they also influenced the voting of his fellow Justices, whose
ability to empathize with the victims of discrimination was

(2006) (arguing that, because it is “inevitable that judges’ different professional and life experiences have some bearing on how they confront various problems that come before them,” it is “important . . . that courts . . . are comprised
of individuals who represent a cross section of the country” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
279. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and
False Empathy, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 61 (1996).
280. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
87, 92 (2002).
281. See id. at 89–90.
282. Cf. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of
Law That Is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity
on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 145–46 (2004) (drawing upon the
reasoning of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), to argue that appointing
a “critical mass” of minority judges will generate meaningful dialogue on the
bench and will improve decision making because minority judges will inform
their colleagues “when positive or negative racial dynamics may be impacting
a legal issue in a way that is not readily discernible to a majority judge”).
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heightened by his stories.283 Similarly, in most cases, it makes
no difference to the votes of male appellate judges whether the
other judges on the appellate panel happen to be men or women. But in sex discrimination cases—where their female colleagues are able to articulate an important, relevant perspective that men do not naturally appreciate—men are
significantly more likely to vote in favor of female plaintiffs if
one of the other judges on the panel is a woman.284
Judges should not, however, have to depend on their colleagues to help them gain a fair appreciation for the unfamiliar
interests of parties from other walks of life. Judges should have
a skill for doing that on their own.285 And they should actively
283. See, e.g., DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 269 (2000) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s statement that
Justice Marshall’s recounting his experiences was important to her because
she had “no personal sense of being a minority in a society that cared primarily for the majority”); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at 5 (1997) (recounting Justice O’Connor’s belief that Justice Marshall “made clear . . . the
impact of legal rules on human lives”); William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to
Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23, 31 (1991) (claiming that
Justice Marshall’s stories were “a form of education for the rest of us. Surely
Justice Marshall recognized that the stories made us—his colleagues—
confront walks of life we had never known.”); Byron R. White, A Tribute to
Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1992) (“Thurgood
brought to the conference table years of experience in an area that was of vital
importance to our work, experience that none of us could claim to
match . . . . [H]e told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of
our own experience.”).
284. See Boyd, supra note 222, at 406 (“[T]he likelihood of a male judge ruling in favor of the plaintiff increases by 12% to 14% when a female sits on the
panel.”).
285. Susan Bandes argues that empathy is not always useful and appropriate in the legal arena. See Bandes, supra note 226, at 365. She fears the
“dark underbelly of empathy” when judges empathize with racists, spousal
abusers, and the like. Id. at 376. In particular, she is concerned that, precisely
because decision makers tend to favor their own perspective, allowing the
judge to consider the emotional impact on all of the parties will just lead him
to overvalue the emotional harm to persons with whom he identifies—since
that is the harm that hits most close to home. “Often one story (usually the
dominant story) drowns out or preempts another (usually the alternative story).” Id. at 386. Thus, “for the alternative story to be heard, sometimes the
dominant story must be excluded.” Id. Her point is not easily dismissed. But
ultimately, it just goes to show the need for genuinely empathic judges. Like it
or not, the judge will instinctively understand and value the dominant story,
even if it is not explicitly told. What we need is a judge with the will and the
capacity to ensure that the alternative story is heard and fully appreciated,
regardless of how powerfully the dominant story resonates with his natural
inclination to share the dominant perspective.
By the same token, Toni Massaro is certainly correct when she asserts
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seek to overcome their own empathic blind spots by selfconsciously endeavoring to understand the perspective of others.286 For instance, in the case involving the reasonableness of
the strip search of a 13-year-old girl at school, discussed above
in Part IV.B.1, Justice Ginsburg was naturally able to empathize with the adolescent girl. She had “been a 13-year-old girl”
herself.287 But Justice Breyer found it difficult to understand
just what the big deal was. At oral argument, Justice Breyer
asked the girl’s attorney to help him to understand the girl’s
perspective:
I’m trying to work out why is this a major thing to say strip down to
your underclothes, which children do when they change for gym, they
do fairly frequently, not to—you know, and there are only two women
there. Is—how bad is this, underclothes? That’s what I’m trying to get
at. I’m asking because I don’t know.288

Justice Breyer was actively seeking to overcome his own empathic blind spots. Having done so, he ultimately joined the
Court’s opinion declaring the search unconstitutional upon a
“careful balancing of [the] governmental and private interests,”
that the law “cannot ‘empathize’ with everyone equally.” Massaro, supra note
64, at 2109. But this Article does not (or not precisely anyway) share her view
that the “significant modern question[ ] . . . [is] not whether judges and ‘law’
should ‘empathize,’ . . . but with whom should we [selectively] empathize?” Id.
at 2110. It is true that “all stories cannot dominate,” and that the law must
ultimately establish substantive rules that tend to favor some interests over
others. Id. at 2110, 2116. But it is not always true that the “concept of empathy cannot . . . assist us in making these hard choices.” Id. at 2116. In fact,
empathy can help the judges who are making the law to better understand all
perspectives before choosing which one to privilege. See supra Part IV.B.3. In
this manner, it can at least “assist” in making the hard choices, even if it does
not obviate the need for those choices altogether. And in any event, empathy
can be an integral tool in applying substantive law (however skewed that law
might be) in the most fair manner possible. It is possible to empathize in that
process broadly, rather than selectively, and whether judges should actively
try to do so remains an important issue in modern discourse.
286. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 414 (1973) (arguing that judges must recognize their own
prejudices and biases in order to nullify their effect); Miller, supra note 53, at
1001 (arguing that empathy “should be an accepted and meaningful tool for
judges” because it “is a crucial cognitive mechanism that can help compensate
for common cognitive bias”); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND.
L.J. 1129, 1166 (1999) (noting that “some legal commentators have suggested
that the adoption of simple or commonsense mental devices, such as engaging
in introspective self-criticism or attempting to feel empathy for people who are
‘different,’ will go a long way towards banishing cognitive bias from persons’
thinking”).
287. Biskupic, supra note 90 (quoting Justice Ginsburg).
288. Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 1064200 at *48–49.
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in which the Court recognized that, from the girl’s perspective,
the search was “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating,”
that “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure,” and that the “degrading” emotional impact of such a search bears no resemblance to “[c]hanging for
gym.”289 That is just what a judge should do.
C. EMPATHY AND POLITICS
I hasten to add that this is not to say that empathic judging necessitates a decision for the girl, rather than the school.
It is just to say that empathic judging requires a willingness
and an ability to emotionally relate to the girl’s side of the case,
not just the administrators’. And more generally, this is not to
say that empathic judging necessarily leads to liberal results,
or is or should be the province of liberal judges alone. It is the
President’s critics who have sought to equate empathy with liberalism. In truth, conservatives are of course capable of empathy too,290 and all judges should endeavor to empathize broadly
in every case. Empathic judging is not liberal judging; it is good
judging. Indeed, one can easily imagine a non-empathic liberal
judge who naturally understands (and thus overvalues) the
girl’s perspective, but utterly fails to give fair weight to the
substantial interest of the school administrators.291 And stepping back, one could surely come up with examples of knee-jerk
liberal judges who habitually and instinctively tend to see cases
only from the perspective of the little guy and routinely fail to
empathize with government, corporate, or wealthy actors.292
We should all be able to agree that that is bad judging too.
289. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 129 S. Ct. at 2639, 2641–42. Justice
Thomas, by contrast, asked no questions at oral argument, and authored a
dissent that repeatedly empathizes with the difficult position in which the
school administrators were placed, but utterly fails to acknowledge the embarrassment visited upon the student. See id. at 2646–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
290. But cf. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 32–36 (2002) (suggesting that the liberal moral value system differs from the conservative one in that, to liberals, morality is heavily
correlated with empathy).
291. Unlike Justice Souter, who made a conscious effort to empathize with
the administrators. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
292. This charge has, for instance, been leveled against Justice Brennan,
who once explained, “What got me interested in people’s rights and liberties
was the kind of family and the kind of neighborhood I was brought up in. I
saw all kinds of suffering—people had to struggle.” Nat Hentoff, The Constitutionalist, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 45, 46. As a child, Brennan “learned
to sympathize with the underdog.” SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE
BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 21 (2010). In law school, he served on the Legal
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Indeed, one might wonder if the entire national debate
about judicial empathy has been nothing more than an overblown semantic miscommunication.293 Conservatives have mistakenly conflated empathy with sympathy—hardly an unforgivable sin, given that the two terms are often used
interchangeably in popular discourse. As a result they have
perceived a great rift in judicial philosophy that is not really
there. In fact, everyone agrees that sympathy is an inappropriate basis for judicial decision making,294 and maybe everyone
agrees that empathy, properly defined, is a desirable quality in
a judge. Perhaps we are all on the same page substantively; we
just need to get our terms straight.
I would not go quite that far. We are probably all closer to
one another than the tiresome partisan rhetoric would suggest,
but at a fundamental level we do remain genuinely divided.
Most conservatives, it seems, continue to accept the notion of
judicial umpiring, and with it the belief that cases can and
should virtually always be resolved without regard to the identity, feelings, and circumstances of the particular parties. As
Aid Bureau, where he “was exposed . . . to . . . the plight of the poor” and came
to empathically understand how the problems of the poor “‘can assume terrifying proportions for the people concerned.’” Id. at 20 (quoting Justice Brennan).
Some scholars have suggested that “Justice Brennan’s empathy for that suffering was one of the most important aspects of his greatness as a Justice.”
Morton J. Horwitz, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV.
23, 24 (1997). But others have argued that, “when we say Brennan was empathetic, we mean he was empathetic to certain groups for which we feel empathy. The other justices may also be empathetic, but to groups that we do not
readily notice or do not sympathize with.” Robert Nagel, Will the Brennan
Legacy Endure?, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 177, 193 (1999) ( providing the remarks of Robert Nagel). These critics charge, in other words, that Justice
Brennan routinely empathized only with the sympathetic underdog. Cf. Frank
I. Michelman, Super Liberal Romance, Community, and Tradition in William
J. Brennan, Jr.’s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1279–80 (1991)
(noting Justice Brennan’s “relative coldness toward managerial and bureaucratic interests in order, calculation, and control,” observing that, “[i]n a dizzying succession of doctrinal contexts . . . Justice Brennan has been the Court’s
predictable anchor against allowing governments and their officials to fend off
liability,” and suggesting that “this whole pack of opinions impliedly demurs to
pleas that liability impairs governmental efficiency, deters governmental application, or, by rendering life in office unruly and uncomfortable, hinders the
government’s ability to attract the best talent to public service”).
293. See West, supra note 84 (manuscript at 6–7) (noting the possibility
that “the anti-empathy turn in our thinking about law might be proceeding
apace on the basis of a sizable definitional mistake”).
294. But see id. at 33 (arguing that “the judge must embrace, not shy away
from, his capacity for empathic and sympathetic engagement with the parties
before him”).
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discussed above, that vision can lead to selective empathy and
bad judging. To be sure, conservative judges could overcome
this shortcoming and still be judicial conservatives. Empathy
need not, and should not, be the unique province of liberal
judges. But at this point in time, it appears that most conservatives do not understand judging in this way.
D. THE RISKS OF EMPATHY
Is there a downside to broadly empathic judges? One might
worry that judges who possess high degrees of empathy would
also tend toward high degrees of sympathy. After all, it stands
to reason that the more that one can truly understand and truly feel the pain and despair of another who is suffering, the
more likely one would be to feel sorry for the sufferer. And one
might further worry that judges who tend toward greater sympathy (as a result of their greater capacity for empathy) would
also tend, whether consciously or subconsciously, to twist the
law to help the downtrodden litigants for whom they feel most
sorry, even when the law does not favor them. Having empathized with all of the parties, the judge may well sympathize
with only one of them—the poor, oppressed, suffering victim.
And then the judge may subconsciously allow that heartfelt
sympathy to color her ultimate decision. In other words, even if
in theory empathy and sympathy are conceptually distinct
phenomena, perhaps in reality they go hand in hand. And thus,
perhaps the President’s critics are ultimately right that a commitment to judicial empathy will inexorably lead to a judiciary
that illegitimately decides cases on the basis of sympathy for
the oppressed, rather than on the basis of law.
This is a nontrivial concern. For a possible example that
also illustrates that judicial empathy is not a uniquely liberal
phenomenon, consider Justice Alito’s solo dissents in two recent
free speech cases—one involving revolting video depictions of
animal cruelty, and the other involving reprehensible, malicious protesting at military funerals.295 In his dissents, Justice
Alito empathized with the speech victims. He felt the “incalculable loss” and “severe and lasting emotional injury” suffered
“at a time of acute emotional vulnerability” by the grieving
parent of the deceased soldier,296 and he both stressed that the
295. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222–29 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592–1602 (2010) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
296. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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“animals used in [the cruel] videos are living creatures that experience excruciating pain,” and offered extensive descriptions
of the horrible suffering that the animals endure.297 In both of
these cases, all eight of the other Justices—liberals and conservatives alike—had little problem finding that the law clearly
favors the repulsive and unsympathetic animal torturers and
protestors. As Michael Dorf explains, “[w]hat distinguishes
Justice Alito’s position from that of the majority in both [cases]
is the clear depth of feeling he expresses for the victims of the
speech . . . . Justice Alito feels more for the victims, or at least
permits his feelings to play a larger role in his legal analysis
than the rest of the Court does.”298 Perhaps Justice Alito allowed his empathy to turn into sympathy, and then allowed his
sympathy to lead him to results that were contrary to the law.
Indeed, we can draw a cautious lesson in this regard from
two psychological studies published by professors at the University of Kansas in 1995.299 In the first study, subjects believed that they were functioning as supervisors and were
asked to assign subordinates to one of two tasks—a desirable
one and an undesirable one. The subjects, who were divided into two groups, received an emotionally moving note ostensibly
from one of the persons being assigned to a task. In the note,
the subordinate explained that she was feeling depressed because her boyfriend had recently broken up with her and that
she really needed something good to happen to her to cheer her
up. One of the subject groups was instructed to “try to take an
objective perspective toward what is described [in the note]. Try
not to get caught up in how . . . she feels; just remain objective
and detached.”300 The other group was told to “try to imagine
how [she] feels about what is described. Try to imagine how it
has affected . . . her life and how . . . she feels as a result.”301
Those subjects who were instructed to remain objective and
avoid empathy assigned the woman to the desirable task only
half of the time. The subjects who were told to empathize with
the woman assigned her to the desirable task seventy-five per297. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1598–1602 (Alito, J., dissenting).
298. Mike Dorf, Could Empathy Explain Justice Alito’s Lone Dissents in
Free Speech Cases, DORF ON LAW (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:22 AM), http://www
.dorfonlaw.org/2011/03/could-empathy-explain-justice-alitos.html.
299. See C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
1042–54 (1995).
300. Id. at 1044.
301. Id.
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cent of the time.302 Although many of the subjects who had
been asked to empathize intentionally gave the downtrodden
woman favorable treatment, they nonetheless were overwhelmingly of the belief that flipping a coin was the most fair way to
assign the tasks.303 This fact led the researchers to conclude
“that although empathy induction introduced considerable partiality, it did not change participants’ perceptions of fairness or
justice in the situation.”304 In other words, the subjects who engaged in empathy found that it led them to sympathize with
the woman—the study found that those who were asked to empathize were more likely to report feelings of sympathy and
compassion305—and that sympathy, in turn, led them to reach a
result that was counter to their own sense of fairness and justice.
In the second study, subjects were told that they were being asked to evaluate the effectiveness of radio advertisements
for a (fictitious) charitable organization that was seeking donations to help improve quality of life for children with terminal
illnesses. Subjects were divided into two groups, each of which
was asked to adopt a particular perspective when listening to
the fundraising advertisement. Subjects in the first group were
asked to “try to take an objective perspective” and to “[t]ry not to
get caught up in how the child [in the advertisement] . . . feels;
just remain objective and detached.”306 Subjects in the second
group were told to “try to imagine how the child . . . feels about
what has happened and how it has affected this child’s life. Try
to feel the full impact of what this child has been through and
how . . . she feels as a result.”307 The advertisement featured a
heartbreaking interview with “Sheri,” a (fictitious) ten-year-old
girl who allegedly suffered from a fatal muscle-paralyzing disease that left her unable to walk more than a few steps in her
heavy braces without falling down.308 The advertisement explained that there was a drug that would allow Sheri full use of
her arms and legs even as her fatal disease inevitably progressed.309 Sheri spoke in her interview of how much she
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1045–46.
Id. at 1046.
See id. at 1045.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
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missed playing with her friends and how her mother had told
her of a drug that would let her ride her bike and go to school
again.310 The advertisement explained that the drug was very
expensive; the charitable organization was hoping to raise the
money to provide it to Sheri.311
After listening to the advertisement, each subject was informed that there was a waitlist for charitable assistance, and
that most children on the waitlist would die before they could
be helped.312 Each subject was then told that the charitable organization had agreed, as a way of thanking the subject for his
or her assistance, to give him or her the power to move Sheri to
the top of the waitlist.313 The subjects were warned, however,
“of the consequences of such a decision. Moving [Sheri]
up . . . means that children who are currently higher on the
Waiting List, due to earlier application, greater need, or shorter
life expectancy will have to wait longer.”314 Subjects who had
been told to empathize with Sheri reported a greater degree of
sympathy for her plight, and were far more likely to move her
to the front of the waitlist, at the expense of other children who
were in greater need.315 The researchers concluded that,
“[r]ather than producing a general sensitivity to the needs of
all, empathy increased sensitivity to the need of the individual
who was the target of empathy,” at the expense of the basic
value of equal justice for all.316
These studies suggest that the concern that empathic judges might tend towards unjust sympathy should not be taken
lightly. But it should also not be overstated. The subjects in
these studies were asked to empathize with only one person—
just the sort of selective empathy that empathic judging aims to
avoid. The subjects were not asked or given the opportunity to
empathize with all of the parties who would be affected by their
decisions.317 In addition, there is no evidence that the subjects
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1049–50.
316. Id. at 1050.
317. Economists sometimes worry that policymakers overemphasize the
immediate and obvious costs and benefits of their decisions—the “seen” effects—and underemphasize the remote and less obvious costs and benefits—
the “unseen” effects. For instance, it is easy to appreciate the benefits to low
income earners of raising the minimum wage, but harder to appreciate the po-
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of these studies were unusually empathic people; they were not
screened in any way for empathic abilities or proclivities. Thus,
these studies give us no reason to think that highly empathic
people (and judges) are any more likely to lapse into sympathy
than less empathic people (and judges). To the contrary, neural
imaging studies reveal that sympathy and empathy are controlled by different regions of the brain.318 As such, they do not
generally go hand in hand. Psychological experiments have
found that many people are very sympathetic, but not particularly empathic—they “exhibit considerable concern for the
plight of others, without experiencing congruent emotions.”319
That is to say, they “have a tendency to be sympathetic but not
empathetic.”320 Many other people “are very empathetic but do
not have a tendency to feel concern or pity for others in
need.”321 In other words, empirical research supports the propositions that “sympathy and empathy are statistically independent” and “that they reflect different psychological processes.”322 Thus, the evidence that greater empathy leads people to
be more likely to take action in favor of the sympathetic “is actually quite weak.”323 An ideal empathic judge should surely be
tential costs to persons whose jobs might be lost or never created, or to consumers who might end up paying higher prices to offset increased labor costs.
Cf. Frédéric Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, LIBRARY ECON. &
LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/basEss1.html (last visited May
2, 2012) (“In the economic sphere . . . a law produces not only one effect, but a
series of effects. Of these effects, the first alone is immediate; . . . it is seen.
The other effects emerge only subsequently; they are not seen. . . . There is only
one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both
the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen.”). By the
same token, it is important for empathic judges to avoid empathizing only
with those whose plight is most obvious or apparent.
318. See Decety & Michalska, supra note 58, at 896 ( presenting the results
of a neural imaging study that “document[s] partially distinct neural mechanisms subserving empathy and sympathy”).
319. Richendoller & Weaver, supra note 59, at 309.
320. Id. at 310.
321. Id.
322. Rand J. Gruen & Gerald Mendelsohn, Emotional Responses to Affective Displays in Others: The Distinction Between Empathy and Sympathy, 51
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 609, 613 (1986). Empathy for those in distress
can sometimes produce sympathy (concern for and a desire to help the sufferer), but it can also produce what psychiatrists call “personal distress”—a selforiented sense of personal discomfort. See N. Eisenberg & R.A. Fabes, Empathy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Relation to Prosocial Behavior, 14
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 131, 131–49 (1990).
323. Jesse J. Printz, Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?, in EMPATHY:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (P. Goldie & A. Coplan
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aware of the dangers of excessive sympathy, and should take
great pains to ensure that her empathy does not lead to subconscious sympathy-based judging. But there is no reason to
think that judges with a high capacity or penchant for empathy
are at a substantially greater risk than their peers of rendering
improperly sympathetic rulings.324 Indeed, highly empathic
judges would probably be more likely to empathize broadly
with all parties, rather than narrowly only with the obviously
sympathetic sufferers—the low-hanging emotional fruit—which
would actually lessen the risk of sympathetic decisions.
CONCLUSION
In opposing the confirmation of Justice Sotomayor, Senator
Charles Grassley insisted that empathy has no role to play in
good judging:
Justice is blind. Empathy is not. Empathetic judges take off the blindfolds and look at the party instead of merely weighing the evidence in
light of what the law is. Empathetic judges put their thumbs on the
scales of justice, altering the balance that is delicately crafted by the
law. Empathetic judges exceed their role as part of the judicial branch
and improperly take extraneous, nonlegal factors into consideration.
That is why President Obama’s judicial standard of empathy is

eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, 8). Studies show no correlation between
empathy and prosocial behavior in children; some studies actually show negative correlation. See id. Studies involving adults show only modest correlation.
See id. (manuscript at 9). Indeed, not only does empathy not correlate with
sympathy (and thus not lead to altruistic action), but also, the experimental
evidence suggests that even sympathy may not correlate well with altruistic
action. Compare Harvey Ginsburg & Tammy Silakowski, Comparing Empathy
and Selfish Rationales Motivating Preschool Children’s Decisions About Wearing Vision-Obscuring Opaque Eyeglasses, 3 J. EDUC. & HUMAN DEV. 1 (2009)
(finding a link between sympathy and altruism), and Gruen & Mendelsohn,
supra note 322, at 609 (recounting studies that have found such a link), with
Christopher J. Einolf, Empathic Concern and Prosocial Behaviors: A Test of
Experimental Results Using Survey Data, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 1267–79 (2008)
(concluding that people who are inherently more sympathetic are generally
not more likely to engage in prosocial behavior).
324. That a capacity for empathy need not lead to sympathy can be illustrated by the work of the famous relative of one of the world’s leading empathy
scholars. Professor Simon Baron-Cohen’s cousin is actor and comedian Sacha
Baron-Cohen. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 113. Sacha Baron-Cohen’s
performances as the bumbling Borat depend on a masterful empathic ability
to understand the uncomfortable feelings that his outrageous behavior causes
in those around him, but he mercilessly takes no action to quell their misery.
See BORAT: CULTURAL LEARNINGS OF AMERICA FOR MAKE BENEFIT GLORIOUS
NATION OF KAZAKHSTAN (20th Century Fox 2006); DA ALI G SHOW (HBO television broadcast 2003–04).
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problematic . . . .325

That is exactly wrong—just about as wrong as it is possible
to be. Empathic judges do not exceed their role as part of the
judicial branch, and they do not improperly take nonlegal factors into consideration. They simply use empathy to ascertain
and make sense of the relevant facts and to apply the relevant
legal factors—thus fulfilling, rather than abdicating, their role
within the judicial branch. They do not place their thumbs on
one side of the scales of justice, altering the delicate balance
crafted by the law. They simply use the tool of empathy to determine the proper weight to be placed on each side of the scale,
so that they can properly decide cases according to the balance
crafted by the law.
I therefore respectfully but emphatically disagree with Professor Kerr’s assertion that President Obama’s call for judicial
empathy means that the President does not believe that a
judge must weigh the best legal arguments on one side and the best
legal arguments for the other, and must pick the side that has the
better of it, no matter how slight the advantage. If a case is 55/45,
then there is a correct answer, because 55 is greater than 45. 326

Empathic judges are no different. They too must always
find in favor of the party that they perceive to have the stronger legal argument. The call for empathy in judging is not premised on a belief that, “[s]o long as there is some appreciable legal ambiguity . . . [m]aybe 70/30 is enough, or maybe even
75/25 will do . . . . [T]he judge can rule in a way that furthers
whatever normative vision of the law that the judge happens to
like.”327
That is not how an empathic judge (or any other judge
committed to the rule of law) goes about deciding a case. Empathy comes into play in deciding which legal conclusion is
stronger—in assigning the percentages, not in overriding them.
Those who support judicial empathy are just as committed
to the rule of law as anyone else. We want judges who follow
the law, too.328 But we recognize that the law is often sufficient325. 155 CONG. REC. S8,780 (Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
326. Kerr, supra note 42.
327. Id.
328. See supra notes 247–53, 263–64 and accompanying text. In a fascinating forthcoming essay, Robin West argues (and laments) that the “antiempathic turn” in our legal thinking is the product of a “‘paradigm shift’ . . . in
our ideals of good judging.” West, supra note 84 (manuscript at 8). Whereas
the traditional, common law view of judging was particularistic and backwardlooking, the emerging post-Realist view of judging is general and forward-
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ly ambiguous or open-ended that there is no objectively correct
answer that can be discerned simply by calling balls and
strikes. We want judges who acknowledge that reality, and who
recognize that the failure to do so not only is arrogant and ignorant, but also undermines justice by facilitating unconscious
favoritism. Empathy is not an obstacle to judicial neutrality; it
is a requirement of judicial neutrality. Thus, we want judges
who are capable of empathy and who seek to engage in it.
After all, a judge who cannot or will not empathize well is
at a great disadvantage. How can she effectively apply (or craft)
legal tests if she lacks the ability to accurately assign value to
the relevant variables in the legal calculus? If “Lady Justice
doesn’t have empathy for anyone,”329 then she is a lousy judge.

looking. We no longer understand the central task of the judge to be the resolution of a particular dispute between individual parties. Rather, we now understand the judge primarily to be in the business of making “social policy” by
“act[ing] as a quasi-legislator within the interstices of rules laid down.” Id. at
36. And when it comes to undertaking that task, “[e]mpathy need not be in the
toolkit.” Id. at 10. If this is correct, it is certainly ironic, given that the public
critique of judicial empathy comes from those who rail against so-called “legislating from the bench.” See supra Parts I, II. But in any event, despite the
views of some economists, see West, supra note 84 (manuscript at 40–43), even
legislators need empathy to make good social policy. See BARON-COHEN, supra
note 56, at 103–04.
329. Long, supra note 37.

